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Unethical actions can have a significant impact on both individuals and societies; 
thus, it is critical to identify factors that can predict such actions. The current research 
investigated two potential predictors of unethical behavior: locomotion and 
assessment regulatory mode (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Locomotion refers to the desire 
for continuous progress or movement in goal pursuit, while assessment refers to the 
desire to critically evaluate and compare among goals and means. Locomotion was 
expected to increase individuals’ tendency to behave unethically, whereas assessment 
was expected to decrease this tendency. Guilt proneness was expected to mediate 
these effects, such that assessors should be more prone to experiencing guilt, and 
should behave more ethically; locomotors, on the other hand, should be less prone to 
experiencing guilt, and should therefore behave less ethically. Furthermore, the effect 
of locomotion on unethical behavior was expected to be stronger when the unethical 
action saved more (vs. less) time. The effect of assessment on unethical behavior was 
  
expected to depend upon the presence of social standards for such behavior: assessors 
should act less ethically if there is a strong (vs. weak) social norm for unethical 
actions. Six studies that utilized a variety of designs and different measures of 
unethical behavior were carried out in order to test these hypotheses. The results were 
generally inconsistent with the hypotheses. Some potential explanations and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Estimates from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund suggest 
that unethical behaviors such as fraud, bribery, and corruption cost the world’s 
economy a staggering $1 to $2 trillion dollars annually (Lawder, 2016; Seager, 2007). 
Ethical transgressions are frequently in the news as well. Recent high-profile cases—
such as the Petrobras corruption scandal in Brazil, which cost the firm billions of 
dollars and rocked the entire country’s economy—offer a vivid example of the 
potentially devastating consequences of such behavior (Gillespie, 2016). Clearly, 
unethical behavior can have a significant impact on both individuals and societies. 
Given these sobering stories and statistics, it is crucial to understand what types of 
individuals are prone to behaving unethically, as well as what drives them to engage 
in such behavior.  
Regulatory mode theory (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski et 
al., 2000; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & Higgins, 2013; Kruglanski, Pierro, & 
Higgins, 2016) can offer an insight into these questions. Being an ethical person is an 
important goal for most people (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), but individuals rarely 
have just one goal at a time; rather, they pursue many goals simultaneously 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). In some cases, several goals may be in conflict with one 
another: for instance, the goal of obtaining quick results at work can interfere with the 
goal of adhering to the ethical guidelines set forth by one’s organization. In such 
situations, as the relative importance of one goal (e.g., obtaining quick results) 
increases, the other goals (e.g., adhering to ethical guidelines) are more likely to be 




2017; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). It follows that individuals who typically 
value certain goals, such as getting things done quickly, may suppress or neglect any 
alternative goals that interfere with obtaining those goals, such as adhering to ethical 
rules. Regulatory mode theory is relevant to this analysis because it identifies two 
determinants of the types of goals that people chronically tend to value: assessment 
and locomotion (Higgins, 2012; Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000, 2013, 
2016). 
Regulatory Mode Theory 
According to regulatory mode theory, assessment is the aspect of self-
regulation related to evaluation, deliberation, and the comparison of various options. 
High assessors are concerned with “doing the right thing.” They are thorough and 
careful, and will spend as much time on a decision as necessary in order to ensure that 
they are making the best choice (Kruglanski et al., 2000). High assessment leads 
individuals to experience increased worry about potential mistakes during goal 
pursuit, greater fear about making the wrong choice, and higher standards for 
personal performance (Pierro et al., 2011). In contrast, locomotion regulatory mode is 
the aspect of self-regulation related to action, motion, and change. High locomotors 
are aptly described by the “just do it” dictum: they act first and think later. They are 
quick to initiate and maintain movement; the direction they are going in matters less 
to them than the experience of motion from state to state. High locomotion leads 
individuals to take less time to complete tasks, at the expense of performing those 





The two regulatory modes can be measured as individual difference variables 
(Kruglanski et al., 2000) or manipulated as situational states (Avnet & Higgins, 
2003). The regulatory mode scales were created in order to gauge individuals’ 
dispositional assessment and locomotion levels: these scales consist of twelve items 
measuring assessment (e.g., “I spend a great deal of time taking inventory of my 
positive and negative characteristics”) and twelve items measuring locomotion (e.g., 
“I enjoy actively doing things, more than just watching and observing”; Kruglanski et 
al., 2000). The two regulatory modes can also be manipulated situationally: past 
studies have primed a state of locomotion or assessment by asking participants to 
write about three times they acted like a locomotor (e.g., “Think back to the times 
when you finished one project and did not wait long before you started a new one”) or 
three times they acted like an assessor (e.g., “Think back to the times when you 
compared yourself with other people”; Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Pierro, Pica, Klein, 
Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2013; Pierro, Presaghi, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2009).  
The locomotion and assessment scales have displayed high predictive validity 
in a variety of participant populations (e.g., employees in organizations, college 
students, and army rangers; Kruglanski et al., 2000) and in many different cultures 
(e.g., Fulmer et al., 2010; Guo & Feng, 2015; Pierro et al., 2008, 2009, 2013). 
Research on the scales’ discriminant validity has also demonstrated that they are 
conceptually distinct from over two dozen related constructs (e.g., Big Five 
conscientiousness and openness to experience, action-state orientation, and fear of 
invalidity; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Importantly, none of the scales included in several 




assessment or locomotion (Kruglanski et al., 2000). This suggests that regulatory 
mode theory describes two fundamental motivational orientations that previous 
constructs did not fully encompass. 
Regulatory Mode & Unethical Behavior 
As mentioned earlier, locomotion and assessment may be relevant to unethical 
behavior because each regulatory mode increases the value of certain goals. 
Locomotors prefer to move swiftly and efficiently whenever possible (Kruglanski et 
al., 2000; Mauro et al., 2009). However, following ethical rules may not be conducive 
to the goal of swift forward motion, because acting ethically can often be more 
effortful, resource-depleting, and slow than simply thwarting those rules and doing 
something unethical (e.g., Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 
2012). As a result, locomotors might dislike having to abide by ethical requirements 
and could be more willing to make unethical decisions. In support of this notion, 
Shalvi and colleagues (2012) found that individuals who were given instructions to 
complete a task quickly—which presumably induced the corresponding goal of rapid 
movement—tended to make less ethical decisions (Shalvi et al., 2012). Assessors, on 
the other hand, have a strong desire to do things right. They are unconcerned with 
acting quickly or taking shortcuts; rather, they are determined to make the best 
decision (Mauro et al., 2009). Consequently, assessors should be less inclined to flout 
ethical rules, because unlike locomotors, they are not motivated to move forward 




objective which does not conflict with—and should even increase—the regard for 
ethics.  
In addition, locomotors are impulsive (Guo & Feng, 2015) and quick to 
initiate action (Pierro, Giacomantonio, Pica, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2011), and 
therefore unlikely to dwell on the consequences of a particular behavior before 
deciding to “just do it” if it serves their momentary goals. Impulsivity and low self-
control have been shown to predict less ethical behavior in both academic and 
business contexts (Anderman, Cupp, & Lane, 2010; Kelly & Worell, 1978; Kisamore, 
Stone, & Jawahar, 2007; Williams & Williams, 2012). Thus, locomotors may be 
more likely to impulsively engage in unethical behavior in order to attain their goals 
swiftly and effectively. Unlike locomotors, however, assessors prefer to carefully and 
thoroughly consider the potential consequences of any given action before choosing 
to engage in it (Kruglanski et al., 2000); such a tendency to broadly evaluate all of 
one’s choices before acting can lead to more ethical behavior (Schurr, Ritov, Kareev, 
& Avrahami, 2012). Similarly, paying close attention to one’s standards of conduct—
a central attribute of assessment—causes individuals to adhere more strictly to ethical 
rules (Mazar et al., 2008). Assessors are also more self-aware and more 
perfectionistic (Pierro et al., 2011), both of which have been linked to a lower 
likelihood of committing unethical acts (Nathanson, Paulhus, & Williams, 2006; 
Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2010; Whitley, 1998). All of these aspects of assessment should 
therefore contribute to assessors’ reluctance to act unethically. 
There are also differences in the extent to which locomotors and assessors 




commit such misdeeds again in the future. High locomotors experience less regret 
over past mistakes (Pierro et al., 2008) and engage in more self-forgiveness after they 
have wronged someone (Pierro, Pica, Giannini, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2018). In 
contrast, assessors experience more regret over past mistakes (Pierro et al., 2008) and 
engage in less self-forgiveness after they have wronged someone (Pierro et al., 2018). 
Researchers suggest that such self-forgiveness and lack of regret can actually increase 
the likelihood that an individual will repeat the same offense, because “forgiving the 
self for...ongoing harmful behavior brings about an emotional relief that weakens a 
person’s motivation to change their behavior, consequently hindering any progress 
toward a stage of action” (Wohl & McLaughlin, 2014, p. 426). Thus, assessors’ lack 
of self-forgiveness and regret over their prior misdeeds may lead them to behave 
more ethically in the future, whereas locomotors’ greater self-forgiveness and 
decreased regret may cause the opposite. 
Relatedly, prior research indicates that individuals’ guilt proneness—that is, 
their tendency to experience guilt after doing something wrong—can impact their 
likelihood of engaging in unethical behavior (Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2013; Cohen, 
Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). More specifically, 
individuals who are prone to feeling guilty are less likely to engage in unethical 
behavior such as harming others (Cohen et al., 2013), using dishonest negotiation 
techniques (Cohen, 2010; Cohen et al., 2011), behaving aggressively when angered 
(Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-
Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996), and committing illegal offenses (Stuewig & 




easily forgive oneself for past transgressions (Cohen et al., 2011). Because 
locomotors are quick to forgive themselves, and assessors are not, it stands to reason 
that locomotors should feel less guilt after a transgression, while assessors should feel 
more guilt. This guilt (or lack thereof) should subsequently impact locomotors’ and 
assessors’ likelihood of committing unethical actions. 
The foregoing analysis suggests the following hypotheses. First, high (vs. 
low) locomotors should be more likely to act unethically (Hypothesis 1), and high 
(vs. low) assessors should be more likely to act ethically (Hypothesis 2). Second, 
locomotors’ increased willingness to behave unethically should be mediated by their 
lesser guilt proneness (Hypothesis 3), while assessors’ decreased willingness to 
behave unethically should be mediated by their greater guilt proneness (Hypothesis 
4).  
Moderating Variables 
Unethical behavior can differ on a variety of dimensions (e.g., Hollinger & 
Clark, 1982; Lasthuizen, Huberts, & Heres, 2011; Mangione & Quinn, 1974; 
Pittarello, Rubaltelli, & Motro, 2016; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Yam, Chen, & 
Reynolds, 2014), and some of these dimensions could influence the extent to which 
locomotion, assessment, or both are relevant to the behavior in question. Locomotors, 
as described in the preceding sections, have a strong preference for moving swiftly 
and not wasting time (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Thus, one aspect of unethical behavior 
that should be particularly important to locomotors is how much time it saves them. If 




engage in it, because acting unethically in such a situation would be highly 
instrumental to their goal of moving forward quickly. 
Assessors, on the other hand, pay close attention to whether their behavior is 
in line with social standards. Individuals who are high on assessment tend to “focus 
on evaluations of their actual self in comparison with…standards, including those 
associated with other people” (Kruglanski et al., 2000, p. 795). This concern for 
norms and standards is also captured in several of the assessment scale items, such as 
“I often compare myself with other people” and “I often feel that I am being 
evaluated by others” (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Prior literature has distinguished 
between two categories of social norms: injunctive norms, which delineate the 
behaviors that most people approve or disapprove of, and descriptive norms, which 
delineate how most people behave (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Cialdini, 
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015; Gelfand & 
Harrington, 2015; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). Individuals who are high on 
assessment should strive to align their behavior with both descriptive and injunctive 
norms, since both types of norms provide information that assessors care about (i.e., 
information about what they need to do in order to reach the standards set by others). 
One intriguing consequence of this is that assessors might be particularly sensitive to 
the presence of both injunctive and descriptive norms for unethical behavior. 
Although the typical or “default” norm in most societies is to behave pro-socially and 
ethically (e.g., Bowles & Gintis, 1998), certain circumstances can evoke a relatively 
strong emphasis on unethical behavior (e.g., when a company’s climate encourages 




Wimbush & Shepard, 1994). Thus, when the (injunctive or descriptive) norm in a 
given situation is to act unethically, assessors should feel compelled to align their 
behavior with the standards of the situation, and should be more likely to behave 
unethically as a result. 
This analysis leads to two moderation hypotheses. First, locomotors should be 
more likely to behave unethically when the unethical behavior in question will save 
them more (vs. less) time (Hypothesis 5). Second, assessors should be more likely to 
engage in unethical behavior when there is a strong (vs. weak) social norm for such 
behavior (Hypothesis 6). 
Unethical Behavior 
In order to test the six aforementioned hypotheses, it is important to establish 
precisely what constitutes an ethical (or unethical) action. Unfortunately, there is no 
clear consensus in the literature as to how to define unethical behavior (see 
Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008, for a detailed discussion of this issue). 
Nonetheless, the definition adopted here will be one that is commonly used in ethical 
decision-making research: unethical behaviors are defined as acts that have harmful 
effects on others and are either “illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger 
community” (Jones, 1991, p. 367). Based on this definition, cheating, lying, stealing, 
and other behaviors that violate ethical norms (e.g., overstating one’s performance on 
a task in order to earn extra money or gain other benefits) all fall under the general 
umbrella of unethical behavior. In line with this definition, cheating in an academic 
context and cheating on a lab task were chosen as the measures of unethical behavior 




Of course, numerous predictors of unethical behavior have already been 
investigated in prior research. These include situational and cultural factors such as 
the probability of being caught, the presence of incentives, the extent to which it is 
easy to justify an unethical action, the salience of other unethical actors, and many 
more (e.g., Ayal & Gino, 2011; Cojuharenco, Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Schminke, 
2012; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Gino & Margolis, 2011; Gino & Pierce, 2009; 
Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008; Mazar et al., 2008; Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010; 
see Bazerman & Gino, 2012, Ford & Richardson, 1994, and O’Fallon & Butterfield, 
2005 for more comprehensive reviews of the literature). Some of the most prominent 
early psychological studies on the situational determinants of unethical behavior were 
Stanley Milgram’s (1963, 1965) groundbreaking experiments, in which he examined 
how far participants would go to obey an authority figure who commanded them to 
carry out actions that were clearly harming another individual. Relevant in this vein, 
too, was Philip Zimbardo’s classic prison study in the 1960s, in which he showed that 
regular college students could be transformed into cruel and brutal prison guards 
merely due to the conditions of the experiment (Zimbardo, Maslach, & Haney, 2000).  
More recent studies have shown that situational norms for ethical behavior 
(e.g., the presence of graffiti or litter in an environment) can influence the extent to 
which individuals engage in unethical behaviors such as littering or theft (Cialdini et 
al., 1990; Keizer et al., 2008). Relatedly, when individuals observe others in their in-
group cheat on a task in order to earn more money, they themselves become more 
likely to do so (Gino et al., 2009). When a person spends more time with someone 




(Mann, Garcia-Rada, Houser, & Ariely, 2014). Upward social comparisons, too, lead 
individuals to engage in more unethical behavior: when participants are randomly 
assigned to be paid less than others for the same dots counting task, they are more 
likely to cheat on the task (John, Loewenstein, & Rick, 2014). In the same vein, the 
presence of student honor codes or organizational codes of ethical conduct—which 
prime individuals with the belief that important others value ethics—both increase the 
likelihood of adhering to ethical standards (McCabe & Trevino, 1993; McCabe, 
Trevino, & Butterfield, 1996; McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 1999). 
More subtle situational factors can also influence unethical actions. Exposure 
to the message that human behavior is predetermined (vs. a message endorsing the 
existence of free will) causes participants to dishonestly overpay themselves for 
performance on a cognitive task (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). The presence of abundant 
wealth (i.e., money lying on a table) leads participants to experience envy for those 
with greater wealth, and therefore cheat more (Gino & Pierce, 2009). Relatedly, being 
part of a higher social class can lead individuals to cut off pedestrians at a crosswalk, 
take valued goods from others, and lie more in a negotiation task (Piff, Stancato, 
Cote, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). Winning a competition causes participants 
to subsequently steal more money from others in an unrelated task (Schurr & Ritov, 
2016). On the other hand, priming the construct of time leads individuals to reflect on 
who they are, and therefore to cheat less (Gino & Mogilner, 2014). When participants 
are primed to think more about their future selves, they are also more likely to 
disapprove of unethical actions (Hershfeld, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012). In addition, 




choices rather than evaluating them in isolation) causes decreased cheating (Schurr et 
al., 2012). 
Other predictors of unethical behavior that have been investigated in past 
research include individual differences such as the Big Five, Machiavellianism, locus 
of control, formalist vs. utilitarian ethical orientation, and a wide variety of others 
(e.g., Anderman, Cupp, & Lane, 2010; Douglas & Martinko, 2001; Egan & Taylor, 
2010; Henle, 2005; John & Srivastava, 1999; Kelly & Worell, 1978; Kisamore et al., 
2007; Malin & Fowers, 2009; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Pearsall & Ellis, 2011; 
Salgado, 2002; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999; Tibbetts & Myers, 1999; Trevino 
& Youngblood, 1990; Williams & Williams, 2012). For instance, some studies have 
shown that Big Five conscientiousness and agreeableness are negatively related to 
unethical behavior: higher scores on each measure lead participants to be less 
accepting of shoplifting and other unethical consumer activities (Egan & Taylor, 
2010). Other studies have demonstrated that the Honesty-Humility factor within the 
HEXACO model of personality is a strong negative predictor of engaging in unethical 
behavior, such as misreporting a die roll in order to earn more money (Hilbig & 
Zettler, 2015). Unsurprisingly, Machiavellianism is consistently positively associated 
with both unethical intentions and behaviors across a wide variety of studies (Kish-
Gephart, Harrison, & Trevino, 2010). Locus of control, too, is related to unethical 
behavior: individuals with an internal locus of control perceive themselves as more 
responsible for their own actions, and are therefore less likely to engage in unethical 
behavior. On the other hand, those with an external locus of control can easily shift 




behavior (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). Individuals who 
are chronically high in mindfulness (i.e., those who tend to have a clear awareness of 
their present state) are more likely to value upholding ethical standards (Ruedy & 
Schweitzer, 2010). And a utilitarian ethical orientation (i.e., focusing on one’s own 
assessment of the consequences of an ethical decision) is positively associated with 
unethical choices and actions, while a formalist ethical orientation (i.e., focusing on 
past precedent and societal norms for ethics) is negatively associated with unethical 
choices and actions (Pearsall & Ellis, 2011).  
The aforementioned inquiries helped shed light on the many diverse factors 
that can contribute to unethical behavior. However, with the exception of several 
experiments that examined the impact of primed promotion and prevention regulatory 
foci on individuals’ propensity to cross ethical boundaries (Gino & Margolis, 2011), 
previous research has largely ignored the question of how chronic and/or 
situationally-induced self-regulation patterns could affect the choice to act 
unethically. It also has not explored how chronic self-regulation patterns might 
interact with aspects of the behavior (e.g., the amount of time an unethical action 
saves) or aspects of the environment (e.g., the presence of social norms for unethical 
behavior) to influence the likelihood that an individual will act unethically. The 
present research aimed to fill these gaps. 
The Present Research 
The six hypotheses described in the preceding paragraphs were tested in six 
studies. The first three studies examined whether there were main effects of 




study tested whether those effects were mediated by guilt proneness (Hypotheses 3 
and 4). The fifth study investigated whether the influence of locomotion on unethical 
behavior was moderated by the amount of time the behavior saves (Hypothesis 5), 
and the sixth study examined whether the influence of assessment on unethical 
behavior was moderated by the presence of strong social norms for such behavior 
(Hypothesis 6). In order to demonstrate that the effects of locomotion and assessment 
on unethical actions could not be accounted for by other variables, the proposed 
studies included three control variables that have been linked to both regulatory mode 
and unethical behavior in past research: self-control and the Big Five characteristics 
of conscientiousness and agreeableness (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 
2011; Cochran, Wood, Sellers, Wilkerson, & Chamlin, 1998; Egan & Taylor, 2010; 
Giluk & Postlethwaite, 2015; Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; Holtfreter, 
Reisig, Leeper-Piquero, & Piquero, 2010; Karim, Zamzuri, & Nor, 2009; Malin & 
Fowers, 2009; Salgado, 2002).  
In the first study, college students completed the regulatory mode scales and 
the control measures online, as well as measures of their attitudes toward unethical 
behavior and the degree of their past engagement in unethical behavior. The second 
study added an actual task that measured participants’ propensity to behave 
unethically. In that study, participants completed the locomotion and assessment 
scales and control measures, then took part in a coordination question task that 
measured their tendency to behave unethically. The third study added a manipulation 
of regulatory mode: participants were randomly assigned to work on a writing prompt 




they took part in the same coordination question task as in the second study. The 
fourth study added a test of the guilt proneness mediation hypothesis: participants 
completed the regulatory mode scales, control measures, and a measure of the 
proposed mediator (the guilt subscale of the guilt and shame proneness scale) in one 
session. They then came to the lab for a second session one to three weeks later, 
during which they took part in the same coordination question task used in the 
previous experiments. The fifth study added a test of the time-saving moderation 
hypothesis: participants first completed the locomotion and assessment scales and the 
control measures. Then they were led to believe that cheating on a subsequent word 
jumble task would either save them 10 minutes (less time saved condition) or 45 
minutes (more time saved condition); the extent of their cheating on this task was 
measured. Lastly, the sixth study added a test of the social norm moderation 
hypothesis. Participants first filled out the regulatory mode scales and the control 
measures. Then they were led to believe that cheating on a subsequent math matrix 
task was endorsed either by the majority of others (strong social norm for unethical 
behavior) or by only a small minority of others (weak social norm for unethical 
behavior); the extent of their cheating was measured. Each of these studies is 




Chapter 2: Study 1 
Method 
Objective 
The main goal of this study was to provide a preliminary test of Hypotheses 1 
and 2 by examining whether there is a relationship between the two regulatory modes, 
attitudes toward unethical behavior, and past engagement in unethical behavior. In 
addition, this study included a self-control scale, the Big Five conscientiousness scale, 
and the Big Five agreeableness scale in order to ascertain whether any potential 
effects of locomotion and assessment on unethical behavior remained even after those 
variables were controlled for. 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty college student participants (91 females; 9 participants 
who did not report their gender) were recruited through the University of Maryland 
SONA system; the average age of participants was 19.79 years (SD = 1.40). The 
necessary sample size for this study was determined via a power analysis in the 
GPower program, assuming a medium effect size, α = 0.05, and .8 power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Students completed the study online, and 
received 1 class credit in exchange for their participation. All participants signed an 
online consent form and were treated in accordance with APA standards.  
Procedure  
Introduction. Participants were told that they would be taking part in a study 




Regulatory mode scales. Participants completed the 12-item locomotion 
scale (α = .83) and the 12-item assessment scale (α = .77). The locomotion scale 
includes items such as “I am a go-getter”, “I enjoy actively doing things, more than 
just watching and observing”, and “When I finish one project, I often wait a while 
before getting started on a new one.” The assessment scale includes items such as “I 
am a critical person”, “I often critique work done by myself or others”, and “I spend a 
great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative characteristics” (see 
Appendices A and B for a complete list of items in each scale; Kruglanski et al., 
2000). Items from both scales were mixed together at random to ensure that there 
were no order effects. The response options for both scales ranged from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
Attitudes toward cheating. Participants completed the 34-item Attitudes 
Toward Cheating scale (α = .81; Gardner & Melvin, 1988), which has been shown to 
predict actual cheating behavior in student samples (Stone et al., 2007). Items from 
this scale include: “There is nothing really wrong with cheating, other than the risk of 
getting caught” and “Students are justified in cheating sometimes.” The response 
options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
Past cheating behavior. Participants then filled out the 13-item Past Cheating 
Behavior Scale (α = .87), which measures the extent to which they engaged in any of 
thirteen cheating behaviors in high school or college (e.g., cutting and pasting 
sentences from either a print or Internet source without attribution, copying another 
student’s paper during a test, or submitting work done by someone else; McCabe, 




studies, which showed that students are willing to admit their own past cheating 
behaviors under conditions of anonymity (with percentages of self-reported cheating 
ranging from 47% to 75%; Baird, 1980; Iyer & Eastman, 2006; Kidwell, Wozniak, & 
Laurel, 2003; McCabe & Trevino, 1993, 1995, 1997; McCabe et al., 2006). The 
response options for the scale ranged from 1 (never) to 6 (often).  
Self-control scale. After the cheating behavior scale, participants filled out 
the 13-item Brief Self-Control Scale (α = .82; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). 
This scale contains items such as “I am good at resisting temptation”, “I often act 
without thinking through all the alternatives” (reverse-scored), and “Sometimes I 
can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong” (reverse-scored). 
The response options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
Big Five scales. After the self-control scale, participants filled out the 9-item 
conscientiousness (α = .81) and 9-item agreeableness (α = .73) scales from the Big 
Five inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). Sample items from the conscientiousness 
scale include: “I see myself as someone who does a thorough job” and “I see myself 
as someone who is a reliable worker”. Sample items from the agreeableness scale 
include: “I see myself as someone who is generally trusting” and “I see myself as 
someone who is helpful and unselfish with others.” The response options for both 
scales ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
Demographics. Participants reported their age and gender. 
Debriefing. Participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study, 





Correlations and descriptive statistics 
The complete correlation table of each of the measures, as well as their means 
and standard deviations, is available in Table 1. As expected, positive attitudes 
toward cheating and past cheating behavior were significantly positively correlated 
with one another (r = .34, p < .001). 
 
Table 1 
Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 1 
 







      
Assessment .17 - 
     
Agreeableness .33*** -.06 - 
    
Conscientiousness .58*** -.13 .31*** - 
   
Self-Control .34*** -.17 .35*** .62*** - 
  
Positive Attitudes -.08 -.11 -.34*** -.12 -.18* - 
 
Past Cheating -.03 .07 -.27** -.13 -.15 .34*** - 
        
Mean 4.16 4.15 3.72 3.59 3.13 2.67 1.63 
SD 0.70 0.68 0.58 0.64 0.62 0.40 0.62 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
Given that cheating can be a sensitive topic that students may be reluctant to 
discuss honestly, some analyses and visual inspections of the data (as recommended 
by, e.g., Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012; Goodwin & Leach, 2006) were carried out to 
test whether there was adequate variability on the two cheating measures used in this 
study. These analyses suggested that at least one of the scales (the past cheating 
behavior scale) may have had some issues with restricted range. The average of 
responses to the past cheating behavior scale (on which the response options ranged 




responses to the past cheating behavior scale were highly positively skewed 
(skewness = 1.5), as 26% of participants had a mean score of 1. However, responses 
to the attitudes toward cheating scale (on which the response options ranged from 1 to 
5) did not appear to have the same issue; that scale had a relatively high mean of 2.67 
(SD = 0.40, Min = 1.59, Max = 3.59) and was not strongly skewed (skewness = -
0.13). 
Main analyses 
To test the main hypotheses, two regressions were conducted.1 In the first 
regression, in the first step, locomotion and assessment were entered as predictors, 
and attitude toward cheating was entered as the outcome variable. Neither locomotion 
(p = .517) nor assessment (p = .249) were significant predictors of attitudes toward 
cheating. In the second step, the interaction between locomotion and assessment was 
added to the regression.2 The interaction was also not a significant predictor of 
attitudes toward cheating (p = .665). The overall model was not significant (R2 = .02, 
F(3, 126) = .75, p = .527). 
                                                 
1 The two regressions described here were also run with self-control, Big Five 
conscientiousness, and Big Five agreeableness included as control variables. Neither the 
significance level nor the direction of the results reported here changed with the inclusion of 
those variables. 
2 The original hypotheses and planned analyses focused only on the main effects of 
locomotion and assessment. However, an exploratory analysis that tested the potential 
interaction between locomotion and assessment was included in this and the following 
studies, because such an interaction was observed in Study 3, and I wanted to examine 




In the second regression, in the first step, locomotion and assessment were 
entered as predictors, and past cheating behavior was entered as the outcome variable. 
Neither locomotion (p = .677) nor assessment (p = .412) were significant predictors 
of past cheating behavior. In the second step, the interaction between locomotion and 
assessment was added to the regression. The interaction was also not a significant 
predictor of past cheating behavior (p = .451). The overall model was not significant 
(R2 = .01, F(3, 126) = .44, p = .722). 
Discussion 
The results of the first study did not provide support for the prediction that 
individuals who were high (vs. low) on locomotion would have more positive 
attitudes toward unethical behavior and would report engaging in more such behavior 
in the past (Hypothesis 1), or the prediction that those who were high (vs. low) on 
assessment would have more negative attitudes toward such behavior and would 
report engaging in less such behavior in the past (Hypothesis 2). Rather, this study 
found that the two regulatory modes appeared to be unrelated to individuals’ attitudes 
toward unethical behavior and their likelihood of having engaged in unethical 
behavior in the past.  
One possible reason that this study may not have found the hypothesized 
effects of locomotion and assessment could lie in the cheating measures. Self-report 
measures of attitudes toward cheating and past cheating behavior are susceptible to 
social desirability effects (Chung & Monroe, 2003; Randall & Fernandes, 1991), 
wherein participants are unwilling to report their true cheating-related attitudes or 




unethical behavior can also be subject to biased self-perceptions, wherein individuals 
are reluctant to admit to themselves that they are the kind of person who would cheat 
or behave dishonestly (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013; Mazar 
et al., 2008). Lastly, although participants were assured that their responses to the 
scales would remain anonymous, all participants were currently enrolled university 
students, which may have caused them to worry about possible negative 
repercussions for admitting to academic cheating.  
The combination of the three issues described above could have led to a 
restriction of range in the cheating measures, which would have reduced the strength 
of any potential correlations between regulatory mode and cheating (cf. Goodwin & 
Leach, 2006). In line with these notions, the average of responses to the past cheating 
behavior scale was very low, and the data from that scale appeared to be restricted in 
range. However, responses to the attitudes toward cheating scale had a relatively high 
mean and appeared to have adequate variability. Thus, the latter scale does not appear 
to have had the same problem as the former. Given that regulatory mode was 
unrelated to either the past cheating behavior or attitudes toward cheating, range 
restriction could not be entirely responsible for the null effects observed in this study. 
Nonetheless, an actual task that offers participants the opportunity to behave 
unethically would provide a stronger test of the main hypotheses. The purpose of the 
next study was to examine whether a different pattern of results would be obtained 





Chapter 3: Study 2 
Method 
Objective 
The main objective of this study was to provide a more compelling test of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Since there were several possible issues with the self-report 
measures utilized in Study 1, this study offered participants the chance to actually 
engage in unethical behavior, with the promise of a monetary incentive if they chose 
to do so. This experiment was also held in the lab rather than online, in order to 
ensure that the results of the previous study could not be attributed to the method of 
administration used in that study. 
Participants 
One hundred and fifteen college student participants (56 females; 5 
participants who did not report their gender) were recruited through the University of 
Maryland SONA system; the average age of participants was 22.47 years (SD = 5.60). 
The necessary sample size for this study was determined via a power analysis in the 
GPower program, assuming a medium effect size, α = 0.05, and .8 power (Faul et al., 
2007). Participants completed the study in the lab, and were told that they could earn 
up to $10 in exchange for their participation, depending on their performance on the 
study tasks. All participants signed a consent form and were treated in accordance 
with APA standards. 
Procedure 
Introduction. Participants were told that they would be taking part in a study 




Regulatory mode scales. Participants filled out the locomotion (α = .83) and 
assessment (α = .79) scales described in the previous study.  
Coordination question task. After completing the above scales, participants 
took part in a coordination question task (adapted from John, Loewenstein, & Rick, 
2014). The coordination question task contained forty questions total, and was split 
into two parts. In each part, participants were told that they would respond to a set of 
twenty questions, and asked to answer each question as they expect the majority of a 
separate group of college student respondents to answer it. Sample coordination 
questions included: “Name a sport that requires a net” (answer: tennis), “Name a 
famous street anywhere in the world” (answer: Wall Street), and “Name a country 
that is an island or islands” (answer: Australia). The correct majority answers were 
based on answers given by college students in a pilot study in previous research (John 
et al., 2014; see Appendix C for a full list of coordination questions and answers). 
Participants were told that they would earn 25 cents per correct answer, up to a total 
of $10 (if they got all of the questions correct).  
In the first half of the coordination question task (which consisted of twenty 
questions), participants were shown the question on one screen, and asked to click 
“continue” when they had a clear answer in mind. Then, on the next screen, they were 
shown the correct answer and asked to select the appropriate choice: “Yes, I guessed 
this answer correctly (will earn 25 cents)” or “No, I did not guess this answer.” This 
portion of the coordination question task allowed participants to overstate the amount 




In the second half of the coordination question task (which also consisted of 
twenty questions), participants were shown the question on one screen, and then 
asked to enter their answer on that same screen. Thus, on the second portion of the 
task, participants could not overstate the amount of answers they got correct. 
Cheating scores were calculated as the difference between participants’ scores on the 
first half of the coordination question task (the opportunity to cheat questions) and 
their scores on the second half of the coordination question task (the no opportunity to 
cheat questions); see Schurr et al. (2012) for a similar measure of cheating.  
In order to make sure that the coordination questions in the first and second 
half of the task were equivalent, the specific questions that were included in the first 
and second halves were counterbalanced across participants.3 The nature of the task 
means that it is not possible to determine whether any given participant cheated on a 
specific question. However, because the questions included in each half of the task 
were counterbalanced across participants, and because participants’ talent at 
answering the coordination questions was unlikely to decline sharply between the 
first and second half of the task, higher scores on the first (vs. second) half of the task 
would indicate that participants were cheating on the first half (see Schurr et al., 
2012, for similar reasoning). 
                                                 
3 A pilot study (N = 27) was carried out to determine the percentage of participants who got 
each coordination question correct; the percent correct for each of the forty questions ranged 
from 15% to 74%. Based on the data from this pilot, the two question blocks created for the 





Self-control scale. Participants filled out the self-control scale (α = .85) 
described in the previous study. 
Big Five scales. Participants filled out the Big Five conscientiousness (α = 
.87) and agreeableness (α = .66) scales described in the previous study. 
Demographics. Participants reported their age and gender. 
Debriefing. Participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study, 
and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Correlations and descriptive statistics 
The complete correlation table of each of the measures, as well as their means 
and standard deviations, is available in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 2 
 
Loc. Ass. Agree. Cons. Self-Con. Cheat 
Locomotion - 
     
Assessment .31** - 
    
Agreeableness .10 -.19* - 
   
Conscientiousness .66*** .17 .25** - 
  
Self-Control .50*** -.04 .25** .71*** - 
 
Cheating .03 .03 .13 .05 .14 - 
       
Mean 4.31 4.23 3.69 3.74 3.08 6.46 
SD 0.71 0.69 0.54 0.66 0.64 3.86 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
In accordance with the logic outlined above, the mean scores on the first half 
of the coordination question task (the opportunity to cheat questions: M = 14.46, SD 
= 3.35) were significantly higher than the mean scores on the second half of the 




2.49; t(111) = 17.71, p < .001). This suggests that at least some participants did cheat 
on the first half of the task by overstating the amount of questions they got correct. 
Cheating scores were calculated by subtracting participants’ scores on the no 
opportunity to cheat questions from their scores on the opportunity to cheat 
questions. Thus, higher scores indicate more cheating. Scores on this cheating 
measure were not highly skewed (skewness = -.24) and appeared to have adequate 
variability, with a mean of 6.46 (SD = 3.86, Min = -5, Max = 15). 
Main analysis  
A regression was carried out in order to test the main hypothesis in this study.4 
In the first step, locomotion and assessment were entered as predictors, and the 
tendency to cheat on the coordination question task was entered as the outcome 
variable.5 Neither locomotion (p = .799) nor assessment (p = .815) were significant 
predictors of the tendency to cheat. In the second step, the interaction between 
locomotion and assessment was added to the regression. The interaction was also not 
a significant predictor of cheating (p = .237). The overall model was not significant 
(R2 = .02, F(3, 108) = .53, p = .660). 
Discussion 
                                                 
4 The analysis described here was also run with self-control, Big Five conscientiousness, and 
Big Five agreeableness included as control variables. Neither the significance level nor the 
direction of the results reported here changed with the inclusion of those variables. 
5 I also conducted a version of this regression that included participants’ scores on the 
opportunity to cheat questions as the main outcome variable, and participants’ scores on the 
no opportunity to cheat questions as a control variable. The significance level and direction of 




The results of this study did not provide any evidence that locomotors were 
more likely to commit unethical actions (Hypothesis 1), or that assessors were less 
likely to commit such actions (Hypothesis 2). This null effect occurred in spite of the 
fact that the current study provided participants with an opportunity to cheat that 
involved no risk of getting caught, and offered them a monetary incentive for 
cheating. Unlike in the first study, restriction of range does not appear to have been 
an issue for the cheating outcome measure in the current study, since the cheating 
scores had a relatively high mean and appeared to have adequate variance. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the null results in this study were a function of restricted range. 
Another potential explanation for the null effects in this study is that the 
purported measure of cheating was actually capturing something other than cheating. 
For instance, it could be argued that participants may have subconsciously engaged in 
wishful thinking (Dunning, 1999; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sinclair, 
1999) or experienced the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975; Guilbault, Bryant, 
Brockway, & Posavac, 2004) upon seeing the answers for some of the opportunity to 
cheat questions. These biases may have led them to click “Yes, I guessed the answer 
correctly” not because they intended to cheat, but because they genuinely believed 
they had had the correct answer in mind (even when they actually had not). If this 
was the case, then the expected relationship between regulatory mode and cheating 
would not materialize, since the cheating measure might be flawed.  
This explanation of the null results in this study is unlikely for several reasons, 
however. On the first half of the task, participants were explicitly instructed to have a 




question. They were shown the correct answer immediately after reading those 
instructions; there was no delay that would have made it easier for them to 
misremember the instructions or forget whether they had had the correct answer in 
mind.6 Thus, it would have been difficult for participants to convince themselves that 
they had actually been thinking of the correct answer if they had not, and the 
difficulty of distorting one’s judgments serves as a constraint on motivated reasoning 
(Belanger, Kruglanski, Chen, & Orehek, 2014; Belanger, Kruglanski, Chen, Orehek, 
& Johnson, 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Kunda, 1990).  
Furthermore, other research that utilized a similar measure of cheating 
examined the possibility that hindsight bias was responsible for participants’ tendency 
to misreport an answer they had had in mind (Schurr et al., 2012). The cheating 
measure used by Schurr and colleagues (2012) consisted of two stages. In the first 
stage (comparable to the no opportunity to cheat portion of the task in the current 
study), participants responded to trivial pursuit questions that they could not cheat on; 
these questions assessed their baseline trivia knowledge. In the second stage 
(comparable to the opportunity to cheat portion of the task in the current study), 
                                                 
6 Informal interviews with the participants after they completed the study revealed that some 
participants understood the task instructions, but purposefully disregarded them and kept two 
or more answers in mind for each question during the first half of the task. Then, as long as 
the correct answer matched one of the ones they had had in mind, they allowed themselves to 
click “Yes, I guessed the answer correctly.” However, this does not pose a problem for the 
validity of the coordination question task as a cheating measure, because intentionally 
disregarding the task instructions in order to get more correct answers (and thus earn more 




participants were presented with a question and instructed to silently think of the 
correct answer. They were then presented with the actual answer and asked to 
indicate whether it was the answer they had had in mind. As in the current study, 
cheating was calculated as the difference of participants’ scores on the first and 
second half of the task (Schurr et al., 2012). Those authors found that even when the 
potential for hindsight bias was eliminated (by having participants write down the 
answer they had in mind on a slip of paper that no one else would see), the pattern of 
results was very similar to that obtained in other studies that utilized that same 
measure of cheating (but did not include participants writing down the answer they 
had in mind). This provides additional evidence that participants’ scores on the 
cheating measure in the present study reflected actual cheating, and makes it doubtful 




Chapter 4: Study 3 
Method 
Objective 
The main objective of this study was to provide an additional test of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, utilizing the same coordination question task described in the last 
study, but this time including a manipulation (rather than a measure) of regulatory 
mode. In order to more persuasively address concerns about the validity of the 
coordination question task as a cheating measure, the current experiment included a 
self-report cheating question at the end of the study. If the coordination question task 
effectively measures cheating, I would expect to find a significant positive correlation 
between self-reported cheating and cheating scores as measured by the coordination 
question task. 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty two college student participants (84 females; 5 
participants who did not report their gender) were recruited through the University of 
Maryland SONA system; the average age of participants was 21.30 years (SD = 3.24). 
The necessary sample size for this study was determined via a power analysis in the 
GPower program, assuming a medium effect size, α = 0.05, and .8 power (Faul et al., 
2007). Participants completed the study in the lab, and were told that they could earn 
up to $10 in exchange for their participation, depending on their performance on the 
study tasks. All participants signed a consent form and were treated in accordance 





Introduction. Participants were told that they were taking part in a study on 
“personality and everyday life.” 
Regulatory mode manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to 
complete either a locomotion manipulation, an assessment manipulation, or a neutral 
(control) writing task (adapted from Avnet & Higgins, 2003).7 In the locomotion 
condition, participants were given the following three writing prompts, adapted from 
the locomotion scale: “Describe several ways in which acting like a doer is beneficial 
to your everyday life”, “Describe several ways in which finishing one project and 
immediately starting another one is beneficial to your everyday life”, and “Describe 
several ways in which actively doing things, rather than just watching and observing, 
is beneficial to your everyday life.” In the assessment condition, participants were 
given the following three writing prompts, adapted from the assessment scale: 
“Describe several ways in which taking inventory of your positive and negative 
                                                 
7 The current manipulation differed from the manipulation created by Avnet and Higgins 
(2003) in two minor respects, both of which were changed in an attempt to strengthen the 
effect. First, rather than having participants write about instances in the past when they acted 
like a locomotor or an assessor (as in the original manipulation), the current manipulation 
asked participants to write about why acting like a locomotor or an assessor was beneficial 
for them in their everyday lives. This was meant to induce the goal of behaving like a 
locomotor or an assessor by convincing participants that such characteristics are desirable. 
Second, two of the regulatory mode scale items chosen for this manipulation differed from 
the items used in the original. Arguably, the two new items better captured the essence of 
locomotion (“actively doing things”) and assessment (“analyzing conversations with others”) 




characteristics is beneficial to your everyday life”, “Describe several ways in which 
analyzing conversations you have had with others is beneficial to your everyday life”, 
and “Describe several ways in which critiquing work done by yourself or others is 
beneficial to your everyday life.” In the control condition, participants were given the 
following three writing prompts: “Describe three foods that you tend to eat in your 
everyday life”, “Describe your typical Wednesday schedule”, and “Describe the style 
of clothing you tend to wear on an everyday basis.” 
Coordination question task. After completing the regulatory mode 
manipulation, participants took part in the same coordination question task (adapted 
from John et al., 2014) described in the previous study.  
Manipulation check. Participants completed the locomotion (α = .86) and 
assessment (α = .77) scales as a manipulation check, in order to investigate whether 
the regulatory mode manipulation worked as expected. 
Demographics. Participants reported their age and gender. 
Self-reported cheating. Upon completing the study and receiving the 
payment they had earned, participants were verbally asked to report whether they had 
cheated during any part of the study. They were told that their honest response to this 
question was very important for the research, and assured that their answers would 
remain completely anonymous.  
Debriefing. Participants were then debriefed about the true purpose of the 
study, and thanked for their participation. 
Results 




The complete correlation table of each of the measures, as well as their means 
and standard deviations, is available in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 3 




Assessment .07 - 
 
 
Self-Report Cheating -.18* -.05 -  
Cheating .10 .09 .39*** - 
     
Mean 4.19 4.17 0.48 6.02 
SD 0.79 0.67 0.50 4.64 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
The mean scores on the first half of the coordination question task (the 
opportunity to cheat questions: M = 14.25, SD = 3.86) were significantly higher than 
the mean scores on the second half of the coordination question task (the no 
opportunity to cheat questions: M = 8.23, SD = 2.67; t(131) = 14.91, p < .001), which 
suggests that at least some participants cheated on the first half of the task by 
overstating the amount of questions they got correct. Scores on the cheating measure 
were not skewed (skewness = -.01) and appeared to have adequate variability, with a 
mean of 6.02 (SD = 4.64, Min = -5, Max = 17). There was also a significant 
correlation between self-reported cheating and the difference between participants’ 
scores on the first and second halves of the coordination question task (r = .39, p < 
.001). 
Manipulation checks 




manipulation and rated how well participants followed the instructions for the 
condition they had been assigned to (0 = not at all; 1 = somewhat; 2 = very well). 
Interrater reliability was very high (Cohen’s κ = .89, p < .001), so the coders’ ratings 
were averaged to create a composite measure of how well participants completed the 
manipulation. The majority of participants (83%) received the highest score on this 
measure, and only 1 person received the lowest score. Excluding participants who did 
not adhere to the manipulation instructions (i.e., scored below 2 on the composite 
measure described above; n = 23) did not change any of the results of the following 
analyses; thus, the analyses reported below include all participants.  
Two analyses of variance were carried out in order to examine whether the 
regulatory mode manipulation shifted participants’ scores on the locomotion and 
assessment scales. The first ANOVA examined whether the condition participants 
were assigned to (locomotion, assessment, or neutral) affected their scores on the 
locomotion scale. However, there were no significant effects of condition on 
locomotion scores (F(2,127) = 0.56, p = .57): the neutral (M = 4.29, SD = 0.71), 
locomotion (M = 4.11, SD = 0.84), and assessment (M = 4.19, SD = 0.82) conditions 
did not differ from one another.  
The second ANOVA examined whether the condition participants were 
assigned to (locomotion, assessment, or neutral) affected their scores on the 
assessment scale. However, there were no significant effects of condition on 
assessment scores (F(2,127) = 1.28, p = .282): the neutral (M = 4.30, SD = 0.59), 
locomotion (M = 4.12, SD = 0.71), and assessment (M = 4.08, SD = 0.70) conditions 




effectively increased individuals’ locomotion and assessment levels.  
Main analyses 
 As in the previous study, cheating scores were calculated by subtracting 
participants’ scores on the no opportunity to cheat questions from their scores on the 
opportunity to cheat questions. An ANOVA was carried out in order to examine 
whether the regulatory mode manipulation affected individuals’ tendency to cheat on 
the coordination question task.8 However, there were no significant effects of 
regulatory mode condition on cheating (F(2,129) = 1.08, p = .343): the neutral (M = 
5.24, SD = 4.37), locomotion (M = 6.16, SD = 4.63), and assessment (M = 6.67, SD = 
4.90) conditions did not differ from one another.  
 An exploratory regression was conducted to investigate whether individuals’ 
scores on the regulatory mode scales affected their tendency to cheat on the 
coordination question task. In the first step, locomotion and assessment were entered 
as predictors, and the tendency to cheat on the coordination question task was entered 
as the outcome variable. Neither locomotion (p = .295) nor assessment (p = .345) 
were significant predictors of the tendency to cheat. In the second step, the interaction 
between locomotion and assessment was added to the regression; the interaction was 
significant (B = -1.57, SE = 0.71, t = -2.22, p = .028). When participants were 
relatively high in assessment (1 SD above the mean), locomotion was not 
                                                 
8 I also conducted a version of this ANOVA that included participants’ scores on the 
opportunity to cheat questions as the main outcome variable, and participants’ scores on the 
no opportunity to cheat questions as a control variable. The significance level and direction of 




significantly related to cheating (B = -0.49, SE = 0.69, t = -0.72, p = .475); however, 
when participants were relatively low in assessment (1 SD below the mean), 
locomotion was positively and significantly related to cheating (B = 1.60, SE = 0.70, t 
= 2.30, p = .023). The entire model was marginally significant (R2 = .05, F(3,126) = 
2.38, p = .073). 
Discussion 
As in the last study, scores on the cheating measure in the current study did 
not seem to have restricted range, since the scores had a relatively high mean and 
appeared to have adequate variability. In spite of this, the current results did not yield 
support for the prediction that individuals primed with high locomotion would exhibit 
more unethical behavior (Hypothesis 1), or the prediction that individuals primed 
with high assessment would exhibit less unethical behavior (Hypothesis 2). Rather, 
the results revealed no differences in cheating between the regulatory mode 
conditions.  
This study demonstrated that there was a significant positive correlation 
between participants’ scores on the cheating measure and their self-reported cheating 
on the task. Of course, there are some potential issues with self-report measures of 
unethical behavior (as discussed in Study 1), which could account for the fact that the 
correlation between self-reported cheating and scores on the cheating measure was 
positive but not extremely high. Nonetheless, the aforementioned correlation still 
provides some additional evidence for the validity of the coordination question task as 




One potential explanation for the null results in this study is that the 
manipulation of regulatory mode may have been ineffective, since it did not shift 
participants’ scores on the locomotion and assessment scales. However, there could 
be other reasons that the manipulation did not affect participants’ scores on those 
scales. The locomotion and assessment scales were administered at the very end of 
the study, after participants had spent 20 to 30 minutes working on the coordination 
question task. Thus, it is possible that any effects of the manipulation had worn off by 
the time participants completed the manipulation check (cf. Perdue & Summers, 
1986). Furthermore, the regulatory mode scales were designed to measure individual 
differences in locomotion and assessment (Kruglanski et al., 2000), and thus may not 
be sensitive enough to capture temporary fluctuations in regulatory mode tendencies. 
Therefore, it is not clear that the manipulation in this study was unsuccessful. Another 
possibility is that the manipulation did work, but locomotion and assessment are 
unrelated to cheating, which would account for the null effects observed in this study. 
The latter explanation is bolstered by the fact that the first two studies utilized a 
measure rather than a manipulation of regulatory mode, but did not find the predicted 
effects either.  
An exploratory analysis did find that the interaction between measured 
locomotion and assessment had a marginally significant effect on cheating: when 
participants were high in assessment, locomotion was not associated with cheating, 
but when participants were low in assessment, locomotion was positively associated 
with cheating. From a theoretical point of view, such an interaction makes sense: the 




of assessment could encourage high locomotors to give in to their impulses to cheat. 
However, the aforementioned interaction should be interpreted with extreme caution, 
given that (a) the first two studies did not find evidence of a similar interaction, (b) 
the interaction was not predicted in this study, (c) locomotion and assessment (the 
predictors in the analysis) were measured after the outcome variable, and (d) the 
regression model was only marginally significant. Thus, it is important to see whether 
evidence of a similar interaction could be found in any of the following studies before 




Chapter 5: Study 4 
Method 
Objective 
The main objective of the fourth study was to investigate a potential 
mechanism that may underlie any effects of locomotion and assessment on unethical 
behavior. To this end, this study included a mediator: the guilt subscale of the Guilt 
and Shame Proneness (GASP) scale. This allowed me to test whether assessors’ 
greater tendency to feel guilt, and locomotors’ lesser tendency to feel guilt, would 
lead them to be respectively more and less ethical (Hypotheses 3 and 4). This 
experiment also included a one to three week break between the measurement of the 
mediator (the GASP scale) and the measurement of the outcome (cheating behavior), 
in order to ensure that the participants did not suspect that the true purpose of the 
study was to investigate unethical behavior. 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty three college student participants (81 females) were 
recruited through the University of Maryland SONA system; the average age of 
participants was 20.23 years (SD = 3.81). The number of participants for this study 
was determined by following published sample size recommendations for bootstrap 
mediation analyses, assuming a medium effect size, α = 0.05, and .8 power (Fritz & 
MacKinnon, 2007). Students completed Part 1 of the study online and Part 2 of the 
study in the lab. After excluding 37 participants who did not complete both sessions 
of the study, the final analyses were run on 116 participants. Participants were told 




performance on the study tasks. All participants signed a consent form and were 
treated in accordance with APA standards.  
Procedure 
The study consisted of two separate portions. During the first session, prior to 
coming into the lab, participants completed the regulatory mode scales, the guilt 
subscale of the Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) scale, the self-control scale, and 
the Big Five conscientiousness and agreeableness scales. During the second session, 
participants came into the lab and completed a task that measured their propensity to 
engage in unethical behavior (the coordination question task). There was a one- to 
three-week interval (Mdays = 9.35, SDdays = 4.20) between the first and second sessions 
of the study. 
First session (online) 
Introduction. Participants were told that they would be taking part in a study 
on “personality and trivia questions.” 
Regulatory mode scales. Participants filled out the locomotion (α = .85) and 
assessment (α = .80) scales described in the previous studies.  
Guilt and shame proneness scale. Participants completed the 8-item guilt 
proneness subscale (α = .69) from the Guilt and Shame Proneness scale (GASP; 
Cohen et al., 2011). The guilt proneness subscale contains four items capturing guilt 
negative behavior evaluations (which focus on the extent to which individuals feel 
bad about their ethical transgressions) and four items capturing guilt repair responses 
(which focus on behavioral intentions that aim to correct or compensate for private 




realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because 
the salesclerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel 
uncomfortable about keeping the money?” and “You lie to people but they never find 
out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel terrible about the lies you 
told?” The response options ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely).  
Self-control scale. Participants filled out the self-control scale (α = .85) 
described in the previous studies. 
Big Five scales. Participants filled out the Big Five conscientiousness (α = 
.85) and agreeableness (α = .75) scales described in the previous studies. 
Demographics. Participants reported their age and gender. 
Second session (in lab) 
Coordination question task. Upon coming in to the lab for the second 
session, participants took part in the same coordination question task (adapted from 
John et al., 2014) described in the previous study. 
Self-reported cheating. After completing the study and receiving the 
payment they had earned, participants were verbally asked to report whether they had 
cheated during any part of the study. They were told that their honest response to this 
question was very important for the research, and assured that their answers would 
remain completely anonymous.  
Debriefing. Participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study, 
and thanked for their participation. 
Results 




The complete correlation table of each of the measures, as well as their means 
and standard deviations, is available in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 4 
 








     
  
Assessment .13 - 
    
  
Agreeableness .17 -.11 - 
   
  
Conscientiousness .55*** -.07 .21* - 
  
  
Self-Control .43*** -.27** .12 .64*** - 
 
  
Guilt Proneness .05 .17 .22* .15 .12 -   
SR Cheating -.03 -.06 .01 -.09 .01 -.05 -  
Cheating .07 .14 -.04 .09 -.05 -.13 .37*** - 
         
Mean 4.19 4.05 3.75 3.75 2.98 5.39 0.51 5.75 
SD 0.76 0.74 0.59 0.66 0.68 0.86 0.50 4.37 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
The mean scores on the first half of the coordination question task (the 
opportunity to cheat questions: M = 13.92, SD = 3.58) were significantly higher than 
the mean scores on the second half of the coordination question task (the no 
opportunity to cheat questions: M = 8.17, SD = 2.42; t(115) = 14.19, p < .001), which 
suggests that at least some participants cheated on the first half of the task by 
overstating the amount of questions they got correct. Scores on the cheating measure 
were not highly skewed (skewness = .30) and appeared to have adequate variability, 
with a mean of 5.75 (SD = 4.37, Min = -4, Max = 16). There was also a significant 
correlation between self-reported cheating and the difference between participants’ 






As in the previous study, cheating scores were calculated by subtracting 
participants’ scores on the no opportunity to cheat questions from their scores on the 
opportunity to cheat questions. In order to test the main mediation hypothesis, two 
mediation analyses9 were conducted using Process (Model 4; Hayes, 2013). In the 
first mediation analysis, locomotion was included as a predictor, guilt proneness10 
was treated as the mediator, and cheating was included as the outcome variable11 (see 
Figure 1 for an illustration of the model). The total effect of locomotion on cheating 
was not significant (B = 0.38, SE = 0.54, p = .475). Locomotion did not have a 
significant effect on guilt proneness (B = 0.05, SE = 0.11, p = .634). Guilt proneness 
                                                 
9 The two mediation analyses and the regression described here were also run with self-
control, Big Five conscientiousness, and Big Five agreeableness included as control 
variables. Neither the significance level nor the direction of the results reported here changed 
with the inclusion of those variables. 
10 Both of the four-item subscales of the guilt proneness scale—guilt negative behavior 
evaluations (GNBE) and guilt repair responses (GRR)—were expected to function similarly 
in this analysis. Since the reliability of the guilt proneness scale as a whole was adequate, and 
there was no theoretical reason to assume that the GNBE and GRR subscales would be 
differentially related to either the predictors or the outcome variables in this study, those two 
subscales were not examined separately in the mediation analyses. 
11 I also conducted a version of each mediation analysis that included participants’ scores on 
the opportunity to cheat questions as the main outcome variable, and participants’ scores on 
the no opportunity to cheat questions as a control variable. The significance level and 




did not have a significant effect on cheating (B = -0.68, SE = 0.47, p = .154). The 
indirect effect of locomotion through guilt proneness on cheating, estimated with 
20,000 bootstrapped samples, was not significant (B = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.28, 0.07]). 
The direct effect of locomotion on cheating was not significant (B = 0.42, SE = 0.53, 
p = .435). The entire model was not significant (R2 = .02, F(2,113) = 1.29, p = .280). 
In the second mediation analysis, assessment was included as a predictor, guilt 
proneness was treated as the mediator, and cheating was included as the outcome 
variable (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the model). The total effect of assessment 
on cheating was not significant (B = 0.80, SE = 0.55, p = .146). However, assessment 
had a marginally significant and positive effect on guilt proneness (B = 0.19, SE = 
0.11, p = .078). Guilt proneness had a marginally significant and negative effect on 
cheating (B = -0.80, SE = 0.47, p = .095). The indirect effect of assessment through 
guilt proneness on cheating, estimated with 20,000 bootstrapped samples, was not 
significant (B = -0.15, 95% CI [-0.61, 0.03]). The direct effect of assessment on 
cheating was marginally significant (B = 0.95, SE = 0.55, p = .086). The entire model 
was marginally significant (R2 = .04, F(2,113) = 2.51, p = .086). 
In order to examine whether the interaction observed in the previous study 
could be replicated, an exploratory regression was conducted to investigate whether 
individuals’ scores on the regulatory mode scales affected their tendency to cheat on 
the coordination question task. In the first step, locomotion and assessment were 
entered as predictors, and the tendency to cheat on the coordination question task was 
entered as the outcome variable. Neither locomotion (p = .593) nor assessment (p = 




interaction between locomotion and assessment was added to the regression. Unlike 
in the previous study, the interaction was not a significant predictor of cheating (p = 
.268). The overall model was not significant (R2 = .03, F(3, 112) = 1.22, p = .306). 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized mediation model of the expected relationship between locomotion, guilt 
proneness, and unethical behavior (Study 4).  
 
 
Figure 2. Hypothesized mediation model of the expected relationship between assessment, guilt 
proneness, and unethical behavior (Study 4).  
Discussion 
This study furnished additional evidence of the validity of the coordination 
question task used in the previous two studies, since participants’ scores on the 
cheating measure were significantly correlated with their self-reported cheating on the 














this study did not appear to have any problems with restricted range. Nonetheless, the 
results of this study did not find support for the prediction that decreased guilt 
proneness underlies locomotors’ tendency to engage in more unethical behavior 
(Hypothesis 3), and found only weak support for the prediction that greater guilt 
proneness underlies assessors’ tendency to engage in more ethical behavior 
(Hypothesis 4). The interaction between locomotion and assessment on cheating 
behavior that was observed in the previous study was also not replicated in the current 
study, suggesting that that finding in the third study was likely due to statistical 
chance.  
The next two studies were conducted in order to investigate whether there are 
moderators that can influence the relationship between regulatory mode and unethical 
behavior. If some such moderators were found, they could potentially account for the 
lack of results observed in the first four studies, since their existence would 
demonstrate that regulatory mode influences cheating only under certain 
circumstances. The two moderators examined in the following studies were the 
amount of time that engaging in an unethical action saves (Study 5), and the presence 




Chapter 6: Study 5 
Method 
Objective 
The main goal of this study was to test the prediction that high locomotors are 
sensitive to the amount of time that unethical behavior saves them, and will therefore 
be more likely to engage in unethical behavior if it saves them more (vs. less) time 
(Hypothesis 5). In addition, this study employed a different measure of unethical 
behavior—a word jumble task—in order to investigate whether the results of the 
previous studies are generalizable beyond the specific tasks used in those studies.  
Participants 
One hundred and sixty one college student participants (104 females; 2 
participants who did not report their gender) were recruited through the University of 
Maryland SONA system; the average age of participants was 19.93 years (SD = 2.74). 
The necessary sample size for this study was determined via a power analysis in the 
GPower program, assuming a medium effect size, α = 0.05, and .8 power (Faul et al., 
2007). Participants completed the study in the lab, and were told that they would earn 
1 SONA credit and up to $5 in exchange for their participation. All participants 
signed a consent form and were treated in accordance with APA standards. 
Procedure  
Introduction. Participants were told that they would be taking part in a study 
on “personality and verbal tasks.” 
Regulatory mode scales. Participants filled out the locomotion (α = .86) and 




Time saving incentive manipulation. After they completed the regulatory 
mode scales, participants were told that the study involved two main tasks: a word 
jumble task followed by a letter counting task. They read instructions explaining that 
the letter counting task involved counting how often the letter “y” appears in a set of 
words, how often a second set of words contains both the letters “o” and “m”, and 
how many out of third set of words are more than eight characters long (Hilbig & 
Zettler, 2015). In one condition (less time saved), participants were informed that the 
letter counting task lasts around 10 minutes. In the second condition (more time 
saved), they were informed that the letter counting task lasts around 45 minutes. 
Importantly, participants were also told that if they did well on the first task in the 
study (i.e., solved all of the presented word jumbles successfully), they would earn a 
bonus of $5 and be able to skip the subsequent letter counting task.12  
Time saved manipulation check & comprehension checks. Before 
continuing to the word jumble task, participants were asked to rate their agreement 
with the following item: “Doing well on the word jumble task would save me a lot of 
time.” Response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Participants also answered two additional questions that assessed whether they 
correctly understood the task: “I need to get all three word jumbles correct in order to 
skip the second task in the study (the letter counting task)”, with response options of 
                                                 
12 The monetary incentive was identical across the two time saved conditions; thus, any 
differences in cheating between the two conditions could only be attributed to the effects of 




true and false, and “How long will the second task in the study (the letter counting 
task) take?”, with response options of 10 minutes, 20 minutes, and 45 minutes.13 
Word jumble task. After answering the questions described above, 
participants were presented with three jumbled words, one at a time, with a maximum 
of one minute to identify each word (adapted from Hoffmann, Diedenhofen, 
Verschuere, & Musch, 2015 and Wiltermuth, 2011). Participants saw the jumbled 
word on a computer screen, and were instructed to click “continue” once they had an 
answer in mind. If they did not click “continue,” they were automatically advanced to 
the next screen after one minute. On the next screen, participants were shown the 
anagram solution and asked to select the appropriate choice: “Yes, I unscrambled the 
word correctly” or “No, I did not unscramble the word correctly.” Thus, participants 
had the opportunity to over-report the number of word scrambles they solved during 
this task. The first two words presented were very easy: unhted and eoshu (which 
were solved correctly by every single participant in a pre-test; Wiltermuth, 2011). 
However, the last word was impossible to solve: unaagt14 (an obscure word which no 
participant in a pre-test was able to solve correctly; Wiltermuth, 2011). Cheating was 
defined as claiming to have solved all three anagrams. 
Self-control scale. Participants filled out the self-control scale (α = .86) 
described in the previous studies. 
Big Five scales. Participants filled out the Big Five conscientiousness (α = 
.86) and agreeableness (α = .77) scales described in the previous studies. 
                                                 
13 The correct answer to the last question differed by condition. 




Letter counting task. In reality, all participants skipped the letter counting 
task, regardless of whether they claimed to have solved all the word jumbles or not. 
After completing the Big Five scales, any participants who had not solved all three 
word jumbles were informed that due to a technical error, they did not need to 
complete the letter counting task. 
Demographics. Participants reported their age and gender. 
Self-reported cheating. Upon completing the study, participants were 
verbally asked to report whether they had cheated during any part of the study. They 
were told that their honest response to this question was very important for the 
research, and assured that their answers would remain completely anonymous.  
Debriefing. Participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study, 
and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 The complete correlation table of each of the measures, as well as their means 
and standard deviations, is available in Table 5. 
 There was a significant correlation between self-reported cheating and 
participants claiming to get all three words correct on the word jumble task (r = .44, p 
< .001), suggesting that the word jumble task was in fact a valid measure of unethical 
behavior. The overall rate of cheating in this study (20%) was comparable to the 
cheating rates observed in previous studies with a similar paradigm (which ranged 
from 15% to 44%; Hoffmann et al., 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011). 




90% of participants understood that they needed to get all three word jumbles 
correct in order to skip the second task in the study, and 91% of participants correctly 
identified the time saved condition they were assigned to. Excluding participants who 
failed one or both of the comprehension checks (n = 26) did not change any of the 
results of the following analyses; thus, the analyses reported below include all 
participants. 
Table 5 
Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 5 
 







     
 
Assessment .12 - 
    
 
Agreeableness .31*** -.16* - 
   
 
Conscientiousness .63*** .01 .34*** - 
  
 





.06 -.03 .12 -.10 -.06 -  
Cheating .13 -.09 .15 -.05 -.09 .44*** - 
        
Mean 4.37 4.16 3.92 3.89 3.21 .11 .20 
SD 0.73 0.61 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.31 0.40 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
A t-test was conducted in order to examine whether individuals in the more 
time saved condition had higher scores on the manipulation check item (“Doing well 
on the word jumble task would save me a lot of time”) than individuals in the less 
time saved condition. There were no significant differences between the less time 
saved condition (M = 6.13, SD = 1.40) and the more time saved condition (M = 6.20, 




Interestingly, however, a chi square analysis revealed significantly higher rates of 
cheating in the more time saved condition (28%) than in the less time saved condition 
(12%; χ²(1, N = 161) = 6.60, p = .01).  
Main analysis 
A logistic regression was conducted in order to test the main moderation 
hypothesis.15 In the first step, locomotion, assessment, and time saved condition were 
entered as predictors, and the tendency to cheat on the word jumble task was entered 
as the outcome variable. Neither locomotion (p = .202) nor assessment (p = .199) 
were significant predictors, but time saved condition was a significant predictor of the 
tendency to cheat (B = .99, SE = .44, Exp(B) = 2.68, p = .026): individuals in the 
more (vs. less) time saved condition were more likely to cheat. In the second step, the 
interactions between locomotion and assessment, locomotion and time saved 
condition, and assessment and time saved condition were added to the regression. 
None of the two-way interactions were significant (locomotion x assessment: p = 
.395; locomotion x time saved condition: p = .644; assessment x time saved 
condition: p = .612). In the third step, the three-way interaction between time saved 
condition, locomotion, and assessment was added to the regression. The three-way 
interaction was not significant (p = .389). The overall logistic regression was not 
significant (χ²(7) = 12.2, p = .094). 
                                                 
15 The logistic regression described here was also run with self-control, Big Five 
conscientiousness, and Big Five agreeableness included as control variables. Neither the 






 The results of this study did not support the prediction that individuals who 
are high (vs. low) on locomotion are particularly concerned with the amount of time 
an unethical behavior saved them (Hypothesis 5), since locomotors’ rates of cheating 
did not differ based upon the amount of time the cheating could save them. These 
results also did not provide support for the prediction that locomotors are more likely 
to cheat in general (Hypothesis 1), or the prediction that assessors are less likely to 
cheat in general (Hypothesis 2). 
This study utilized a different measure of unethical behavior than the prior 
three studies, in order to examine whether the results observed in those studies could 
be replicated with another measure. Although overall rates of cheating in this study 
were not particularly high, they were within the range of what other studies with 
similar designs had obtained (Hoffmann et al., 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011), indicating 
that restricted range does not pose a problem for testing the main hypotheses. As in 
the previous studies, the cheating variable in this study was significantly associated 
with self-reported cheating, suggesting that it was in fact a valid measure of cheating. 
Thus, the fact that cheating was not predicted by locomotion and assessment in the 
current study implies that there may not be a relationship between regulatory mode 
and cheating. 
 There were no significant differences in participants’ scores on the time saved 
manipulation check (“Doing well on the word jumble task would save me a lot of 
time”) based on the condition they were assigned to; at first glance, this makes it 




for the null results in this study. However, there are several reasons that this is 
unlikely to be the case. First, overall scores on the time saved manipulation check 
item were very high (with a mean of 6.17 on a scale of 1 to 7), and the majority of 
participants in both conditions (66%) selected 7 on the scale. This suggests that the 
lack of differences between the time saved conditions might have been due to ceiling 
effects, since all participants reported believing that they could save a lot of time by 
cheating, regardless of condition. Importantly, participants in both time saved 
conditions believing that cheating would save them a lot of time still allows for a test 
of how locomotors behave when cheating saves them time. If locomotors are 
particularly responsive to the amount of time cheating saves them, high (vs. low) 
locomotors should have exhibited higher rates of cheating in the present study, 
regardless of the time saved condition they had been assigned to. The fact that this 
was not the case indicates that locomotors may not actually be attuned to the amount 
of time that cheating saves them. 
It is worth noting that there were significant differences in overall rates of 
cheating between the two time saved conditions. This indicates that even though 
participants in the more (vs. less) time saved condition did not consciously recognize 
that they could save more time, the larger amount of time they could save nonetheless 
served as a stronger incentive for cheating. Crucially, however, the value of that 
incentive did not appear to differ for locomotors and assessors, because although rates 
of cheating differed by time saved condition, the expected interaction with regulatory 
mode did not materialize. This pattern of results suggests that, in contrast to 




larger quantity of time. 
The next study examined another potential moderator of the link between 
regulatory mode and cheating: the presence (vs. absence) of social norms for 




Chapter 7: Study 6 
Method 
Objective 
The main goal of this study was to test the prediction that assessors strive to 
ensure that their behavior is in accordance with social standards, and are therefore 
more likely to act unethically if they believe it is the norm in a particular 
circumstance (Hypothesis 6).  
Participants 
One hundred and thirty eight college student participants (88 females; 2 
participants who did not report their gender) were recruited through the University of 
Maryland SONA system; the average age of participants was 19.83 years (SD = 1.91). 
The necessary sample size for this study was determined via a power analysis in the 
GPower program, assuming a medium effect size, α = 0.05, and .8 power (Faul et al., 
2007). Participants completed the study in the lab, and were told that they would earn 
up to $10 in exchange for their participation, depending on their performance on the 
study tasks. All participants signed a consent form and were treated in accordance 
with APA standards. 
Procedure  
Introduction. Participants were told that they would be taking part in a study 
on “personality and number tasks.” 
Regulatory mode scales. Participants completed the locomotion (α = .85) and 




Social norm manipulation. Participants were asked to read a brief news story 
about a fictitious website (adapted from Yam et al., 2014): 
Two graduate students at Dartmouth are on a mission to make 
opinions on different social issues more public through a new 
web polling site called Open Vote. Discerning public consensus 
on social issues can be a challenge, the creators of the site say, 
and their project attempts to provide that service. Open Vote 
co-founder Colin Van Ostern said: “Currently we have 
conducted online surveys of more than 20,000 individuals 
nationwide, from large major metropolitan areas to rural 
areas.” When polling University of Maryland students 
specifically, the Open Vote website found the following. 
Participants were then presented with a list of ten findings that were ostensibly 
taken from the organization’s website (e.g., “71% of University of Maryland students 
believe that global warming is a serious problem”; see Appendix D for the full list). 
Embedded within those findings was a manipulation of the acceptability of unethical 
behavior among University of Maryland students. In the strong social norm for 
cheating condition, participants read that 62% of University of Maryland students 
consider it acceptable to cheat if there is no chance of getting caught. In the weak 




Maryland students consider it acceptable to cheat if there is no chance of getting 
caught.16  
Since there is no theoretical reason to believe that assessors would react 
differently to injunctive vs. descriptive norms for cheating, the current manipulation 
focused on injunctive norms because some studies have shown that injunctive norms 
have a stronger effect on behavior (e.g., Choi, Park, & Noh, 2016; Reno, Cialdini, & 
Kallgren, 1993; but see Lally, Bartle, & Wardle, 2011 and Rivis & Sheeran, 2003 for 
the opposite claim). The manipulation specifically emphasized norms for cheating 
among University of Maryland students, in line with prior research and theorizing 
                                                 
16 A pre-test was conducted in order to assess the efficacy of this manipulation on University 
of Maryland students (N = 46). Pre-test participants were randomly assigned to read either the 
strong (n = 22) or weak (n = 24) social norms for cheating article. They were then asked to 
report their opinion about how many University of Maryland students consider it acceptable 
to cheat if there is no chance of getting caught, whether the article they read provided 
accurate information about University of Maryland students, whether Open Vote is a reliable 
source of information about University of Maryland students, and how carefully they read the 
article they were presented with. In line with predictions, participants in the strong social 
norm condition reported believing that more University of Maryland students found it 
acceptable to cheat (M = 4.32, SD = 1.32), compared to participants in the weak social norm 
condition (M = 2.79, SD = 1.41; t(44) = -3.77, p < .001). Importantly, there were no 
significant differences between conditions in how accurate (p = .804) or reliable (p = .972) 
participants believed the information in the article to be, or in how carefully they read the 




which suggests that the norms of one’s in-group (vs. an out-group) are more likely to 
influence behavior (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Wenzel, 2004). 
Math matrix task. In the next part of the study, participants were given a set 
of twenty matrices filled with 3-digit numbers (see Figure 3 for a sample matrix). 
They had fifteen seconds to find the pair of numbers in each matrix that adds up to 10 
(a total of five minutes for the twenty matrices). Previous research has shown that 
five minutes is not enough time to solve all twenty math matrices (Gino & 
Wiltermuth, 2014; Mazar et al., 2008; Welsh & Ordonez, 2014; Yam et al., 2014). 
Participants were informed that they would earn 50 cents for each correctly solved 
matrix, up to a total of $10 (if they solved all of the matrices). They were shown one 
matrix per screen, and asked to click “continue” when they had an answer in mind. If 
they did not click “continue,” they were automatically advanced to the next screen 
after fifteen seconds. On the next screen, participants were shown the correct answer 
to the matrix and asked to select the appropriate choice: “Yes, I guessed this answer 
correctly (will earn 50 cents)” or “No, I did not guess this answer.” Thus, participants 
had the opportunity to over-report the number of matrices they got correct during this 
task.  
 




Self-control scale. Participants completed the self-control scale (α = .85) 
described in the previous studies. 
Big Five scales. Participants completed the Big Five conscientiousness (α = 
.84) and agreeableness (α = .82) scales described in the previous studies. 
Social norm manipulation check. Participants responded to the following 
question as a manipulation check: “In your opinion, how many University of 
Maryland students consider it acceptable to cheat if there is no chance of getting 
caught?” Response options ranged from 1 (none of them) to 7 (all of them), with a 
midpoint of 4 (half of them). They were also asked three additional questions to probe 
the efficacy of the manipulation: “Do you think the article you read provided accurate 
information about University of Maryland students?”, with response options ranging 
from 1 (not at all accurate) to 7 (very accurate); “Do you think Open Vote is a reliable 
source of information about University of Maryland students?”, with response options 
ranging from 1 (not at all reliable) to 7 (very reliable); and “How carefully did you 
read the article you were presented with?”, with response options ranging from 1 (not 
at all carefully) to 7 (very carefully). These questions were embedded among nine 
filler items such as “In your opinion, how many University of Maryland students 
believe it is important to save for retirement?” and “In your opinion, how many 




Math ability. Participants responded to the following question about their 
math ability17: “How good are you at math?” Response options ranged from 1 (very 
bad) to 7 (very good), with a midpoint of 4 (about average).  
Demographics. Participants reported their age and gender. 
Self-reported cheating. Upon completing the study and receiving the 
payment they had earned, participants were verbally asked to report whether they had 
cheated during any part of the study. They were told that their honest response to this 
question was very important for the research, and assured that their answers would 
remain completely anonymous.  
Debriefing. Participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study, 
and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Correlations and descriptive statistics 
The complete correlation table of each of the measures, as well as their means 
and standard deviations, is available in Table 6. 
Scores on the matrix task in this study were not highly skewed (skewness = -
.60) and appeared to have adequate variability, with a mean of 14.36 (SD = 4.56, Min 
= 2, Max = 20). There was a significant correlation between self-reported cheating 
and participants claiming to have solved more matrices (r = .44, p < .001), suggesting 
that the matrix task was a valid measure of unethical behavior. In a regression that 
included both self-reported cheating and self-reported math ability, although both 
                                                 
17 Due to a programming error, responses to this question were not collected for the first 28 




variables were significant predictors of scores on the matrix task (R2 = 0.26, F(2, 106) 
= 18.59, p < .001), self-reported cheating was a stronger predictor (β = .47, p < .001) 
than math ability (β = .24, p = .005).  
Table 6 
Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 6 
 





SR Cheat Cheat 
Locomotion - 
     
  
Assessment .13 - 
    
  
Agreeableness .11 -.22** - 
   
  
Conscientiousness .57*** -.18* .24** - 
  
  
Self-Control .44*** -.27** .17 .69*** - 
 
  
Math Ability .24* .16 -.07 .18 .14 -   
SR Cheating -.05 -.08 .13 -.02 -.06 -.07 -  
Cheating .08 .07 .07 -.02 -.09 .21* .44*** - 
         
Mean 4.32 4.28 3.81 3.76 3.13 5.25 .50 14.36 
SD 0.72 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.67 1.27 0.50 4.56 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
Manipulation check 
A t-test was carried out to examine whether individuals in the strong (vs. 
weak) social norm for cheating condition had higher scores on the main manipulation 
check item (“In your opinion, how many University of Maryland students consider it 
acceptable to cheat if there is no chance of getting caught?”). In line with the results 
of the pre-test, participants in the strong social norm condition reported believing that 
a higher proportion of students at their university consider it acceptable to cheat if 
there is no chance of getting caught (M = 5.14, SD = 0.71), compared to participants 




There were no significant differences between social norm conditions in how accurate 
(p = .172) or reliable (p = .125) participants believed the information in the article to 
be, or in how carefully they read the article (p = .476). 
Another t-test revealed that social norm condition did not influence the 
number of matrices a participant claimed to have solved (t(136) = 0.04, p = .970). 
Participants in the strong social norm condition (M = 14.38, SD = 4.18) and the weak 
social norm condition (M = 14.35, SD = 4.94) had similar scores on the matrix task. 
Interestingly, however, the social norm manipulation did influence self-reported 
cheating (χ²(1, N = 138) = 8.38, p = .004): rates of self-reported cheating were 
significantly higher in the strong social norm for cheating condition (62%) than in the 
weak social norm for cheating condition (38%). 
Main analysis 
Cheating was operationalized as the number of matrices a participant claimed 
to have solved. A multiple regression analysis was conducted in order to test the main 
moderation hypothesis.18 In the first step, locomotion, assessment, and social norm 
condition were entered as predictors, and cheating was entered as the outcome 
variable. Neither locomotion (p = .404), assessment (p = .484), nor social norm 
condition (p = .906) were significant predictors of cheating. In the second step, the 
interactions between locomotion and assessment, locomotion and social norm 
                                                 
18 The multiple regression described here was also run with self-reported math ability, self-
control, Big Five conscientiousness, and Big Five agreeableness included as control 
variables. Neither the significance level nor the direction of the results reported here changed 




condition, and assessment and social norm condition were added to the regression. 
None of the two-way interactions were significant (locomotion x assessment: p = 
.707; locomotion x social norm condition: p = .812; assessment x social norm 
condition: p = .728). In the third step, the three-way interaction between social norm 
condition, locomotion, and assessment was added to the regression. The three-way 
interaction was not significant (p = .525). The overall model was not significant (R2 = 
.02, F(7, 130) = .29, p = .957). 
Discussion 
 This study did not find evidence that high (vs. low) assessors were particularly 
sensitive to the presence of social norms for unethical behavior, such that they 
exhibited a stronger tendency to act unethically if they believed that this type of 
behavior was the norm in a given situation (Hypothesis 6). These results also did not 
yield any support for the prediction that locomotors are more likely to cheat in 
general (Hypothesis 1), regardless of social norms for cheating. 
One possible explanation for this null effect is that the measure of cheating 
used in this study may have been flawed. Because the current study did not contain a 
baseline evaluation of participants’ performance on the math matrices (i.e., how well 
they did when they could not cheat), scores on the matrix measure may have been 
determined not just by participants’ willingness to cheat, but also by their math 
ability. Relatedly, the social norm manipulation in this study effectively influenced 
manipulation check responses and rates of self-reported cheating, which suggests that 
the manipulation was successful. Since cheating was expected to be affected by the 




norm manipulation did not impact scores on the matrix task could signify that the 
matrix task may not have been a clean measure of cheating.  
In an attempt to address this issue, this study included measures of self-
reported math ability and self-reported cheating in order to help determine whether 
math skills or cheating were truly driving higher scores on the matrix measure. 
Admittedly, a self-report measure of math aptitude is less than ideal, because (a) 
participants might not have accurate insight into their level of math skills, and (b) 
participants responded to the math ability question after the matrix task, which means 
their performance on the matrix task may have biased their evaluations of their math 
skills—in other words, if participants cheated on the matrix task, they may have been 
unwilling to report low math aptitude for fear of being suspected of cheating. 
Nonetheless, such a measure can still provide some insight into participants’ general 
perceptions of their math talent, which can be useful for distinguishing between the 
two possible explanations for higher scores on the math task. Thus, the fact that 
scores on the matrix task were more strongly associated with the self-reported 
cheating measure than with the math ability question implies that higher scores on the 
math matrix task were mainly indicative of increased cheating. Furthermore, 
controlling for math aptitude in the analyses did not change any of the main results, 
which also suggests that the null effects in this study cannot simply be attributed to 
the possibility that higher scores on the matrix task were due to higher math ability.  
Notably, many studies have shown that locomotion has a positive main effect 
on task performance across a wide variety of performance measures (Pierro, 




Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2012). If the matrix scores in the current task were truly 
indicative of higher performance, then locomotion would still be expected to predict 
them, given past findings on the relationship between locomotion and performance. 
Thus, the fact that locomotion was not associated with scores on the matrix task can 
actually be interpreted as another piece of evidence for the argument that the matrix 
task was measuring cheating rather than math performance. 
More broadly, any potential flaws in the matrix measure of cheating used in 
this study cannot have led to the null results observed in all the studies, since the first 
five studies utilized different measures of cheating but obtained similar results. 
Rather, the most reasonable explanation for the results of this and the other studies is 
that there is no association between locomotion, assessment, and unethical behavior; 
this point will be discussed in more detail in the General Discussion. 
It is interesting to note that the social norm manipulation appeared to be 
effective in this study, but in spite of that, assessors did not respond to it as 
expected—they did not align their behavior with the norm. While it is unclear from 
the current results whether assessors are not particularly attuned to social norms in 
general, not particularly attuned to injunctive norms, or not particularly attuned to 
norms for cheating, future research should probe the potentially intriguing 




Chapter 8: General Discussion 
 The effects of regulatory mode on unethical behavior are an intriguing but 
heretofore unexplored area of research. Across six studies, I aimed to show that 
locomotion would lead to more unethical behavior, whereas assessment would lead to 
more ethical behavior. Moreover, I investigated whether guilt proneness mediated the 
relationship between the two regulatory modes and unethical behavior, such that 
assessment would lead to increased guilt proneness and therefore more ethical 
behavior, while locomotion would lead to decreased guilt proneness and therefore 
more unethical behavior. Lastly, I tested two potential moderators of the effects of 
locomotion and assessment on unethical behavior: the amount of time that an 
unethical behavior saves, and the presence of strong social norms for unethical 
behavior. To enhance the generalizability of the effects, the proposed studies utilized 
a variety of methods (i.e., both online and in-lab study administration) and included 
several different operationalizations of unethical behavior (i.e., self-reports of 
attitudes toward cheating and past cheating behavior, a coordination question task, a 
word jumble task, and a math matrix task). However, with some limited exceptions, 
the results of the studies generally did not provide support for the hypotheses. Some 
possible explanations for these null effects are discussed in more detail below. 
One reason that the first study may not have found the hypothesized effects of 
regulatory mode could involve the self-report measures utilized in that study. Self-
report measures of attitudes toward cheating and past cheating behavior could be 
susceptible to a social desirability bias, in which participants are hesitant to report that 




such an admission would make others view them negatively (Chung & Monroe, 
2003; Randall & Fernandes, 1991). Self-report measures of cheating can also be 
subject to biased self-evaluations. Individuals are typically motivated to view 
themselves positively (e.g., Baumeister, 1993; Epstein, 1973; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, 
& Downs, 1995; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988) and do not wish to think of themselves 
as cheaters (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bryan et al., 2013; Mazar et al., 2008). These 
motivations may bias their memory of the extent to which they engaged in unethical 
behavior in the past, and lead them to underreport their actual degree of cheating. In 
addition, all of the participants in the first study were current college students; 
although they were assured that the survey was anonymous, they may nonetheless 
have been concerned that admitting to holding positive attitudes toward cheating, or 
having cheated in the past, could get them in trouble with the university.  
All three of the aforementioned issues in the first study could have led to a 
restriction of range in scores on the self-report scales, particularly on the past cheating 
behavior scale. In line with this notion, average scores on the past cheating behavior 
measure were very low, and other analyses suggested that restricted range may have 
been an issue for that specific scale. However, restricted range could not entirely 
explain the null effects in the first study, since one of the two scales (the attitudes 
toward cheating scale) did not have any issues with restricted range. Furthermore, 
social desirability concerns, biased self-evaluations, and worries about the negative 
repercussions of cheating were less of a concern in the other five studies, since 
participants in those studies had the opportunity to cheat with no risk of getting 




restricted in range, which suggests that even if range restriction was an issue in the 
first study, it cannot be a plausible explanation for the null effects observed across all 
the studies.  
A potential reason that the second study may not have found the hypothesized 
effects of regulatory mode on cheating could have been related to the measure of 
cheating utilized in that study. More specifically, it is possible that when participants 
were presented with the answers to the opportunity to cheat questions, wishful 
thinking (Dunning, 1999; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999) 
or the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975; Guilbault et al., 2004)—rather than any 
conscious intention to cheat—led them to overstate the amount of answers they had 
actually gotten correct. If the cheating measure was flawed in this way, then the study 
could not provide a strong test of the hypothesis that regulatory mode should 
influence unethical behavior. 
However, there are several reasons to believe that the coordination question 
task in the second study was, in fact, a valid measure of cheating. Participants were 
directed to “have a clear answer in mind” before viewing each answer on the 
opportunity to cheat portion of the task. They saw the correct answer immediately 
after having read those instructions, so if they followed the directions19, the memory 
of the answer they had chosen should have been fresh in their thoughts, and thus 
                                                 
19 As mentioned earlier, some participants in the study admitted to intentionally ignoring the 
instructions and keeping multiple answers in mind during the task. However, this does not 
affect the validity of the cheating measure, because purposefully disregarding the task 




difficult to distort. Prior studies have demonstrated that motivated cognition is 
constrained by the difficulty of biasing one’s beliefs or impressions (Belanger et al., 
2014; Belanger et al., 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Kunda, 1990), suggesting that 
motivated distortion is not a plausible explanation for participants’ higher scores on 
the opportunity to cheat portion of the coordination question task.   
Other research involving a cheating measure that resembled the coordination 
question task directly addressed the possibility that hindsight bias, rather than 
cheating, may have been responsible for the obtained results (Schurr et al., 2012). 
Those researchers asked participants to make an explicit self-commitment to a 
specific answer (by writing it down on a piece of paper no one else would see); this 
should eliminate the possibility of the hindsight bias, since participants could not 
deceive themselves about the answer they had chosen. Even with this change in their 
design, however, Schurr et al. (2012) obtained comparable results to those observed 
in other studies that had utilized the same measure of cheating. This offers further 
support for the notion that participants’ scores on the coordination question task are 
due to actual cheating rather than a manifestation of the hindsight bias. Importantly, 
the other two studies that used the coordination question task (Studies 3 and 4) 
included a self-report measure of cheating in order to provide additional evidence that 
the coordination question task was a valid measure of cheating. Scores on the self-
report cheating item were consistently positively correlated with cheating as 
measured by the coordination question task, suggesting that the coordination question 
task effectively measured cheating. This in turn implies that the null effects in Study 




between regulatory mode and unethical behavior. 
The null results of the third study could be attributed to the fact that the 
manipulation of locomotion and assessment may have been unsuccessful, since it did 
not shift participants’ scores on the regulatory mode scales administered at the end of 
the study. However, there are several reasons to believe that this is not necessarily the 
case. First, there was a long (20 to 30 minute) gap between when participants 
completed the manipulation and when they filled out the regulatory mode scales. This 
means that it is possible that participants were in the appropriately manipulated 
locomotion or assessment mindset during the coordination question task, but that it 
had worn off by the time they reached the end of the study (cf. Perdue & Summers, 
1986). Another possibility is that because the regulatory mode scales were originally 
developed as a measure of chronic individual differences (Kruglanski et al., 2000), 
they may be ill-equipped to capture fleeting situational fluctuations in locomotion and 
assessment. Moreover, if an ineffective manipulation of regulatory mode led to the 
null results in this study, we would expect the other five studies—which utilized the 
regulatory mode scales rather than a manipulation—to have found the predicted 
results. However, the fact that this was not the case suggests that the null results in the 
third study should not necessarily be ascribed to an unsuccessful manipulation of 
regulatory mode; rather, they are most likely due to the lack of association between 
regulatory mode and unethical behavior. 
 A possible explanation for the lack of results in the fifth study is that the time 
saved manipulation did not work as expected, since participants in both time saved 




(with a mean of over 6 on a 7-point scale in both conditions). However, the lack of 
differences between conditions does not necessarily pose a problem for examining 
how locomotors react when cheating saves them a lot of time. Since participants in 
both conditions were convinced that they could save time by cheating, if high (vs. 
low) locomotors were truly more sensitive to the amount of time cheating saves them, 
they should have cheated more in this study. There were also higher rates of cheating 
in the more (vs. less) time saved condition, demonstrating that even if participants did 
not consciously perceive it, they had greater incentive to cheat in the more time saved 
condition. Importantly, however, the expected interaction with regulatory mode was 
not obtained, which signifies that the value of the time saved incentive did not differ 
for locomotors and assessors. Thus, the null results in the fifth study point to the 
conclusion that locomotors are not more likely to cheat, even when they believe it 
will save them a large amount of time. 
 The null effects in the sixth study could be related to a potential flaw in the 
cheating measure. That study did not include a way to measure participants’ 
performance on the matrices when they did not have the opportunity to cheat, which 
means that higher scores on the math matrices may have been indicative not only of 
increased cheating, but also of higher math ability. Importantly, the social norm 
manipulation appeared to be effective in that study, because it shifted rates of self-
reported cheating and manipulation check responses in the predicted direction. Since 
actual cheating was also expected to be impacted by the social norm manipulation, 
one explanation for why it was not is that the matrix measure was not an adequate 




 In an effort to disentangle the two possible reasons for higher scores on the 
matrix task, the sixth study included self-report questions of both math aptitude and 
cheating. Of course, there are some problems with a self-report measure of math 
skills: participants may not be able to accurately identify their true level of math 
ability, or their evaluation of their math aptitude could be distorted by the fact that 
they completed the ability item after the matrix task. (For instance, it is possible that 
participants would hesitate to report low math ability if they had just cheated and 
gotten a very high score on the matrices.) Despite these potential issues, however, a 
self-report measure of math aptitude can still offer a glimpse into participants’ 
judgments of their own math skills, which can help detect whether increased scores 
on the matrix task were mostly due to cheating. In fact, matrix scores were more 
strongly associated with self-reported cheating than to math ability, suggesting that 
the matrix scores constituted a reasonable measure of cheating. Controlling for math 
ability in the analyses did not influence any of the findings, which provides additional 
evidence that the null results in the sixth study occurred not because of a problem 
with the cheating task, but because there is no relationship between regulatory mode 
and unethical behavior. 
 Although each of the individual studies discussed above had some 
weaknesses, when taken as a whole, the studies provided a reasonable test of the six 
hypotheses outlined in the introduction. In other words, after ruling out the other 
explanations discussed above, the most likely explanation for the current findings is 
that there is, in fact, no association between regulatory mode and unethical behavior. 




across six studies that utilized a variety of designs and several different measures of 
cheating.  
It is worth noting that were two exceptions to the null results. In Study 3, there 
was an unpredicted, marginally significant interaction of locomotion and assessment 
on cheating behavior, such that locomotion was significantly related to increased 
cheating only when participants were low (vs. high) on assessment. In Study 4, there 
was a marginally significant mediation effect: increased assessment led to increased 
guilt proneness, which in turn led to decreased cheating. Unfortunately, however, 
these findings do not provide compelling evidence for the existence of a link between 
regulatory mode and cheating, since one of the results was unpredicted, each effect 
was observed only in a single study, and each of the analyses was one of numerous 
other statistical analyses conducted in the course of the research—all of which can 
increase the likelihood of false positive findings (Funder et al., 2014; Gelman & 
Loken, 2013; Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Thus, the 
most reasonable conclusion from the present research seems to be that there is no 
connection between locomotion, assessment, and unethical behavior. 
That said, there is a caveat to the aforementioned claim about the lack of 
relationship between regulatory mode and unethical behavior. Because cheating is a 
prototypical example of unethical behavior, and because the present studies all used 
cheating to measure unethical behavior, the terms “cheating” and “unethical 
behavior” have been used interchangeably throughout this manuscript. Nonetheless, 
the specific unethical behaviors that were examined in the current research were 




or cheating on a lab task (Studies 2-6). While cheating is certainly a common 
manifestation of unethical behavior, it is far from the only manifestation, and it is 
easy to think of unethical behaviors that do not fall into the category of cheating (e.g., 
blackmail, bribery, sexual harassment, and discrimination, to name just a few). Thus, 
although the present set of studies provided some evidence that regulatory mode is 
not associated with cheating, these results do not necessarily mean that regulatory 
mode is unrelated to all aspects of ethics or morality. Future studies should therefore 
examine whether there are other types of ethical thought or behavior that locomotion 
and assessment may be associated with.  
Future Directions 
Interestingly, some recent experiments have found that high locomotion was 
associated with greater endorsement of binding moral foundations (i.e., moral 
foundations that emphasize individuals’ binding to groups such as their family, their 
country, or their religious organization; Haidt & Graham, 2007), because those 
foundations were perceived as useful for coordinating action (Cornwell & Higgins, 
2014). This finding provides some preliminary evidence that regulatory mode can be 
related to differences in moral beliefs; future research should probe this relationship 
and investigate whether locomotors’ variations in moral beliefs lead to differences in 
their moral behavior. For instance, prior research has shown that stronger 
endorsement of the binding foundations is linked to an increased willingness to harm 
(or fail to help) outgroup members (Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). It 
would be intriguing to examine whether locomotors exhibit an increased willingness 




binding moral foundations). 
Future studies could also explore whether there are some other moderating 
variables—beyond the ones tested in the present research—that differentially 
influence locomotors’ and assessors’ tendencies to behave unethically. For instance, it 
is possible that when an extremely important goal is blocked (e.g., when one 
encounters a traffic jam on the way to a high-stakes job interview), an individual who 
is high on locomotion would be more likely to behave unethically (e.g., by running 
red lights), because the locomotor would be so frustrated by the obstacle that he or 
she would be willing to do anything to work around it. The current studies may not 
have included goals that were of adequate importance to bring out locomotors’ 
tendency to do anything necessary (including acting unethically) in order to get 
around goal blockages or delays. Future studies should examine whether the 
combination of increasing goal importance and adding an obstacle on the path to goal 
attainment would lead locomotors to behave unethically, when doing so would enable 
them to quickly get around the obstacle and achieve their valued goal. 
The Big Five, Self-control, and Unethical Behavior 
It is interesting to note that with the (partial) exception of the first study, Big 
Five conscientiousness, Big Five agreeableness, and self-control were not correlated 
with cheating in the present research (see Tables 1-6). These findings contrast with 
some research that demonstrated that those constructs were associated with unethical 
behavior (e.g., Barnes et al., 2011; Cochran et al., 1998; Egan & Taylor, 2010; Giluk 
& Postlethwaite, 2015; Gino et al., 2011; Grasmick et al., 1993; Holtfreter et al., 




studies have demonstrated that conscientiousness and agreeableness are unrelated to 
unethical behavior (Hilbig & Zettler, 2015), and researchers have theorized and found 
that unethical behavior should be linked to the Honesty-Humility factor within 
HEXACO rather than to any of the Big Five (Ashton & Lee, 2008; Hilbig & Zettler, 
2015; Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005; Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, 
2008). Similarly, some studies have found that self-control is only a weak predictor of 
unethical behavior, and its effect disappears once other variables are accounted for 
(Tibbetts & Myers, 1999; Wolfe & Higgins, 2009). The mixed results in prior 
research suggest that the mostly non-significant correlations between agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, self-control, and cheating obtained in the present studies are not 
entirely surprising. It is possible that different operationalizations of the predictors 
(e.g., manipulating self-control via an ego depletion task [Gino et al., 2011] vs. 
measuring it with a scale) or different operationalizations of the outcome measures 
(e.g., self-reports of fraud or shoplifting [Grasmick et al., 1993; Holtfreter et al., 
2010] vs. cheating in the lab) may have contributed to the inconsistency between the 
prior research and the current results. Future studies could fruitfully investigate why 
self-control and the Big Five are associated with unethical behavior in some studies 
but not others. 
Theoretical Implications 
The fact that the current results were inconsistent with the original hypotheses 
may have some intriguing theoretical implications. Regulatory mode theory typically 
characterizes locomotion regulatory mode as a single-minded focus on movement, 




theorizing on locomotion almost invariably includes the following one-sentence 
summary of locomotion: “[locomotion is] the aspect of self-regulation concerned with 
movement from state to state”—a line that originated in Kruglanski and colleagues’ 
(2000, p. 794) first theoretical paper on regulatory mode, and has been quoted 
extensively ever since (e.g., Amato, Pierro, Chirumbolo, & Pica, 2014, p. 1; Avnet & 
Higgins, 2003, p. 526; Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004, p. 400; Higgins et al., 2003, 
p. 295; Higgins, 2012, p. 268; Lucidi et al., 2016, p. 703; Kumashiro, Rusbult, 
Finkenauer, & Stocker, 2007, p. 595; Mannetti et al., 2009, p. 1120; Pierro et al., 
2012, p. 249). This more recent quote paints a very similar portrait of locomotion: 
“Heightened locomotion is epitomized by a craving for movement and an impatience 
with barriers, blockages, and delays” (Kruglanski et al., 2013, p. 81). These 
conceptualizations of locomotion as the pure desire for movement make it reasonable 
to hypothesize that locomotors will be willing to engage in any behavior—including 
unethical behavior—if doing so helps them quickly move toward their goals. 
However, there are other aspects of the locomotion construct which are often 
neglected, but which may prove to be key facets of locomotion regulatory mode. One 
example of this is the strong association between locomotion and conscientiousness, 
which has been demonstrated both in the United States (Kruglanski et al., 2000) and 
in a variety of other cultures (Higgins, 2008; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006a; 
Pierro et al., 2011). The current studies consistently replicated the positive link 
between locomotion and conscientiousness (with correlations ranging from .55 to 
.66), while also revealing a fairly strong association between locomotion and self-




locomotion cannot involve only a single-minded concentration on action, motion, and 
change. Conscientiousness encompasses at least some goals that may conflict with 
engaging in psychological movement (e.g., the desire to be orderly, responsible, and 
dependable, which may require a lack of change in order to be accomplished 
effectively; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990; John & Srivastava, 1999). 
Relatedly, many acts of self-control, such as resisting a temptation, involve refraining 
from engaging in action (Baumeister, 2002; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodrigues, 1989; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney et al., 2004). Prior research has also found 
that locomotion is associated with persevering on goals even in the face of difficulty 
or adversity, rather than simply moving on from them (Pierro et al., 2011; Pierro, 
Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006b)—which again seems to contradict the picture of 
locomotion as a simple “craving for movement.” In short, all of these findings appear 
to be incompatible with the notion that locomotors are solely concerned with swiftly 
moving from state to state and avoiding blockages or delays. 
Taken together, the aforementioned relationships between locomotion and 
other constructs, as well as the null results in the current studies—which imply that 
locomotors do not, in fact, go to any lengths to move quickly toward their goals—
suggest that the current theoretical conceptualization of locomotion may need to be 
revised. Locomotors may sometimes have competing goals—e.g., to be quick and to 
be conscientious—and these goals could sometimes cancel each other out. 
Alternatively, depending on the situation, one or the other goal may take priority. The 
theoretical construct of locomotion may need to be reworked in order to incorporate 




goals, some of which may even be incompatible with one another. Future studies 
could then examine the circumstances under which one aspect of locomotion (e.g., 
the desire for speed) predominates over other facets of locomotion (e.g., the desire to 
be conscientious and thorough).   
To a certain extent, the theoretical concept of assessment may face a related 
issue. Assessment is often described as involving a strong emphasis on “doing the 
right thing” (Kruglanski et al., 2000, p. 793) and a “desire for perfection, often 
accompanied by anxiety about possible errors” (Kruglanski et al., 2013, p. 81). In 
spite of these theoretical descriptions of assessment, both the current research and 
prior studies have found that assessment is typically unrelated to conscientiousness 
(Higgins, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro et al., 2006a; Pierro et al., 2011)—
even though conscientiousness involves several of the aforementioned characteristics 
ascribed to assessment, such as avoiding mistakes and striving for perfection (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992; Stoeber, Otto, & Dalbert, 2009). Furthermore, recent theorizing on 
regulatory mode has suggested that there is an ethical component to high assessment: 
assessors are motivated to seek truth (Higgins, 2012), and “in seeking the truth, 
people want to establish not only what is correct and real but also what is right, 
including morally right” (Cornwell, Franks, & Higgins, 2017, p. 204). However, the 
current studies offered some evidence that assessment is unrelated to “doing the right 
thing” in the domain of ethical behavior. These results may necessitate a theoretical 
refinement of the assessment construct, in order to elucidate how and why assessors’ 
desire to “do the right thing” (Kruglanski et al., 2000, p. 793) may be limited in 




into doing the right thing ethically. 
Another intriguing possibility is that the construct of assessment may involve 
competing goals that camouflage its effects on unethical behavior. For instance, 
assessors’ higher perfectionism (Pierro et al., 2011) could prime them with the goal of 
performing well at all costs—which might actually incline assessors to engage in 
more unethical behavior in order to attain that goal. If assessors simultaneously have 
the goal of doing the right thing in the ethical sense, the aforementioned desire for 
perfectionism might conflict with the ethical goal, and the two goals could cancel 
each other out (thus leading assessment to seem unrelated to unethical behavior). 
Future research could investigate the circumstances under which one or the other goal 
is more salient for assessors, and subsequently examine how such goal salience 
influences assessors’ behavior in both the ethical domain and in other spheres. 
Conclusion 
 Six studies were conducted in order to test the idea that locomotion and 
assessment regulatory modes can influence individuals’ likelihood of engaging in 
unethical behavior (which was operationalized as cheating in the present research). 
The studies utilized multiple methods of administration (i.e., both online and in the 
lab) and included a variety of cheating measures (i.e., self-reported attitudes toward 
cheating and past cheating behavior, a coordination question task, a word jumble task, 
and a math matrix task). The studies also tested a potential mediator of the proposed 
effects (individuals’ tendency to experience guilt), as well as two potential 
moderators of the proposed effects (the amount of time an unethical behavior saves, 




did not provide support for the hypotheses; overall, the findings imply that there may 





The complete list of items in the locomotion regulatory mode scale (Kruglanski 
et al., 2000). 
1. I don't mind doing things even if they involve extra effort.  
2. When I finish one project, I often wait awhile before getting started on a 
new one. (Reverse-coded) 
3. I am a "workaholic."  
4. I feel excited just before I am about to reach a goal.  
5. I enjoy actively doing things, more than just watching and observing.  
6. I am a "doer."  
7. When I decide to do something, I can't wait to get started.  
8. By the time I accomplish a task, I already have the next one in mind.  
9. I am a "low energy" person. (Reverse-coded) 
10. Most of the time my thoughts are occupied with the task I wish to 
accomplish.  
11. When I get started on something, I usually persevere until I finish it.  











The complete list of items in the assessment regulatory mode scale (Kruglanski 
et al., 2000). 
1. I never evaluate my social interactions with others after 
they occur. (Reverse-coded) 
2. I spend a great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative 
characteristics.  
3. I like evaluating other people's plans.  
4. I often critique work done by myself or others.  
5. I often compare myself with other people. 
6. I often feel that I am being evaluated by others.  
7. I am very self-critical and self-conscious about what I am saying.  
8. I rarely analyze the conversations I have had with others after they occur. 
(Reverse-coded) 
9. I am a critical person.  
10. I don't spend much time thinking about ways others could improve 
themselves. (Reverse-coded) 
11. I often think that other people's choices and decisions are wrong.  
12. When I meet a new person I usually evaluate how well he or she is doing 








The complete list of coordination questions and answers used in Studies 2-4 (John, 
Loewenstein, & Rick, 2014). 
Question      Answer 
1. Name something you eat that starts with the word "Corn".                         (corn) bread 
2. Name a country in which there seems to be never-ending violence.                Israel 
3. Name a summer vacation state.                                                             Florida 
4. Name a source of energy that people used before oil.                                  coal 
5. Name a word used to describe people who are overweight (other than 'big').   fat 
6. Name something you eat by the slice.                                                     pizza 
7. Name a sport that requires a net.                                                           tennis 
8. Something that melts easily.                                                                  butter 
9. Name a country that was involved in World War II.                                  Germany 
10. Name a specific kind of whale.                                                              killer (whale) 
11. Name a quiet animal.                                                                          cat 
12. Name something that starts with the word "French".                                 (french) fries 
13. Name someone famous whose last name is "Marx".                                 Karl (Marx) 
14. Name a landmark famous for its height.                                                 Empire State Building 
15. Name a kind of engineer.                                                                     mechanical (engineer) 
16. Name a bird that has long legs.                                                              ostrich 
17. What board game do you play best?                                                      Monopoly 
18. Name something that gives off heat.                                                     fire 
19. Name a fruit you might buy and let ripen in your home.                             banana 
20. Name a country that's an island or islands.                                               Australia 
21. Name the one household appliance you would hate to be without.                microwave 
22. Name something you measure in measuring cups.                                     flour 
23. Name something you wear that has holes in it that you don't want seen.        underwear 
24. Name a food that's terrible when consumed cold.                                      soup 




26. Write down a word that begins with "under__".                                         underwear 
27. Past or present, name a famous artist.                                                     (Pablo) Picasso 
28. Name a famous street anywhere in the world.                                           Wall (Street) 
29. Name an American city that begins with the letter "S".                               San Francisco 
30. Name a city that tourists flock to.                                                          New York City  
31. A word you might hear in a courtroom during a trial.                                  guilty 
32. Name a composer of classical music.                                                      Mozart 
33. Name a state that was part of the confederacy during the American civil war. South Carolina 
34. Name something in a grocery store whose price stays pretty much the same.  milk 
35. Name a kind of seed that people eat.                                                      sunflower (seeds) 
36. Name something with holes in it.                                                          (Swiss) cheese 
37. Name a food that you buy more than one of at a time.                               eggs 
38. Name a person, past or present, who is adored by most Americans.              (George) Washington  
39. Name something people fall out of.                                                        love 







The full text of the strong social norm for cheating article used in Study 6. The weak 
social norm for cheating article was identical to this one, except that it stated that 
“11% of University of Maryland students consider it acceptable to cheat if there’s no 
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